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Patient Safety in Rural Settings
Preface

T

he materials offered in this patient safety manual draw on
information from a robust database consisting of qualitative
and quantitative data gathered over the past nine years.
These data come from a 4-year patient safety study conducted in
rural hospitals in a 9-state area as well as a series of additional
healthcare studies that focused on ethics and decision-making in
rural settings.

“We don't
talk enough.
But, it is so
good to talk
to someone
who gets it.”
~ Physician.

The materials we offer have been shaped by the insights and
suggestions of healthcare professionals who participated in our
various studies. Over the years, these providers have echoed a
common theme. They want access to resources that are designed
for rural settings rather than adapted from urban healthcare
systems for use in rural areas. They have specifically asked for
resources that are practical, succinct, and easy to disseminate.

When we began this rural patient study, we offered the participants
a variety of nationally-produced traditional resources including
journal articles, books, videos, and internet resources that focused
on patient safety. Although the healthcare providers expressed
appreciation for these efforts, none of the resources were widely
used. We often heard the phrase, “it all looks interesting, and I'd
like to have time to use them, and they really do look helpful. But
we really just don't have time.”

To some extent the resources we offered did not seem to fit the
rural context. We were working with generalists who wear many
hats and have very limited time. We were working with
healthcare settings where educational opportunities, especially
interdisciplinary activities, are very limited.

i
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Preface (continued)

T

hus we have tried to develop a resource that fits the rural
context. The first chapter discusses the national patient
safety movement. In succeeding chapters we discuss
definitions of errors and lessons learned from our multi-method
patient safety study. We then discuss approaches that might help
achieve the delivery of safer care. The final chapter contains
resources that can be used by rural healthcare providers in order to
support system-wide patient safety efforts.

“It usually
goes well, but
I am not sure
that everyone
is willing to
change their
behaviors.”
~ Pharmacist

The exercises and tools in the final chapter are designed to
promote “skillful discussion." Such a discussion uses inquiry and
collaborative reflection as means for coming to agreement and
making decisions. We hope this approach will help healthcare
providers think together and use awareness of their differences to
increase their collective wisdom to promote patient safety. True
dialogue achieves the following:
?
The participants feel that they can be honest and truthful;
?
The participants listen to others and feel that others are
listening to them;
?
All opinions and ideas are given the same space and
respect;
?
Participants broaden their perspectives and awareness.

The renowned quantum mechanical physicist, David Bohm,
offers an interesting way to think about this kind of dialogue or
skillful discussion. He suggests that the original meaning of
dialogue was "meaning passing or moving through . . . a free flow
of meaning between people in the sense of a stream that flows
between two banks."

ii
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Preface (continued)

O
“ I don’t
know if we
ignore the
errors, or if
we think
that
something is
not
important
and so don’t
do it. Until
someone
comes to
review, and
we think:
‘Oh, my.’”
~ Nurse

ur findings clearly underscore the need for dialogue in
order to provide quality healthcare. Many of our medical
errors and problems arise from a lack of dialogue,
awareness, and understanding. The communication theorist,
William Isaacs, says that dialogue creates the opportunity for
coherent, collective thought instead of fragmentation. It offers a
way to step back and consciously notice how we are thinking and
feeling. With this awareness, we can begin asking questions about
the deep sources of our thoughts and feelings. Such questions
could include:

?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

What are our deeply held beliefs?
What are the assumptions from which we're operating?
What are our mental models of what's going on and being
considered, and where did those models come from?
What images and metaphors pervade our language?
What is happening inside us as well as in the team or
group?
Are we even looking at the same data?
Are we thinking in the moment or from memory or
projection?
What is the quality of our listening -- to ourselves and to
each other?
What is the collective field and meaning we are creating
together?

Throughout the manual you will see, in the margins, comments and
perspectives offered by the healthcare providers who participated
in this effort. We hope that these comments will spur dialogue and
help identify areas where improvements can be made in your
healthcare setting.

iii
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T

he patient safety study described in this manual was
supported by grant number R01- HS11930 from the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Some of the
materials also reflect lessons learned from studies that were
supported by the Greenwall Foundation and the Charles E.
Culpeper Foundation, a division of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

“We realized
we were only
human and
not able to
practice
medicine
without
making any
errors.”
~ Physician

We hope you will find this manual useful and invite you to share
your responses and your suggestions with us. All of the materials
are free of charge and can be copied and disseminated without
permission. They are available on a CD as well as online via our
website: http://www.umt.edu/bioethics.

We express our appreciation to AHRQ for providing the funds to
conduct this patient safety study. We also express our deep
appreciation to all of the healthcare providers who have shared
their ideas and their stories with such candor and commitment.
This effort would not have been possible without such
unwavering support, commitment, honesty, and enthusiasm.

Ways to Use This Manual
?
Create an inter-disciplinary study group to study the
findings and discuss implications for your hospital;
?
Share the manual with relevant committees such as Quality
Control, P&T, Infection Control, etc;
?
Use the quotes in the margins as topics for staff discussion;
?
Leave copies of the case studies in accessible places such
as nursing station and staff and physician lounges;
?
Offer a CME/CEU evening meeting during which cases are
discussed;
?
Conduct a Readers Theater presentation using the script
that is provided;
?
E-mail copies of case studies to staff so as to initiate a
virtual discussion;
?
As you educate staff, also consider ways to educate the
public so that risk and strategies to reduce risk are better
understood;.
?
Explore ways that the resources and tools in Chapter 6 can
be used for quality improvement activities.
iv
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Patient Safety in Rural Settings
The Patient Safety Movement

E

very healthcare provider strives to provide safe care. After
all, the goal of medicine has traditionally been to respond to
need, to rescue those in peril, and to reduce and relieve
suffering. This goal, however, may not be easy to achieve. Indeed
a report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), entitled To Err is
Human, ranks medical errors somewhere between the fifth and
eighth leading cause of death in the United States. The report
noted that more people die as a result of medical errors or mistakes
than die from motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDs.
Errors are costly. The annual costs of adverse events are estimated
to range between $37.6 billion and $50 billion. Medication-related
errors are estimated to add $4,700 per admission.

“More people
die as a result
of medical
errors or
mistakes than
die from motor
vehicle
accidents,
breast cancer or
AIDs.”
~ IOM

When issuing the report in 1999, the IOM called for a 50%
reduction in errors within five years. In order to achieve that
goal, the report discussed the importance of designing systems
that “make it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for
people to do the right thing.” The report contains
recommendations for a government sponsored patient safety
center, mandatory reporting systems for deaths and serious
injuries, voluntary reporting of less serious injuries and close
calls, and the transparent disclosure and analysis of error. The
goal, according to the IOM report, is a “no shame/no blame
environment” and the development of a culture of safety.

When describing the need for increased safety, many media reports
make “safer healthcare” sound like a straightforward and
manageable endeavor. It seems that we can achieve a safer
environment if errors are consistently acknowledged, reported,
resolved, and disclosed. This proactive approach helps create a
culture of safety in which both healthcare providers and patients
play active roles.

Chapter 1
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The Patient Safety Movement (continued)

W

ithout doubt, progress on achieving patient safety has
been made since the IOM report was first issued.
Certainly, healthcare providers are more cognizant of
errors and their repercussions for both patients and providers.
There is growing recognition that the status quo is not acceptable.
And there is growing recognition that safety is an important first
step in improving the quality of care.

“Our
healthcare
providers do
not recognize
them as errors,
they see them
more as just
something that
happened unpreventable”
~ Nurse

However, the IOM goal of reducing errors by 50% within five
years has proven elusive. Although some patient safety
advocates have called for mandatory reporting systems, others
note that such systems tend to focus attention on a few, limited
types of errors. Thus errors that we have not been prompted to
recognize are consistently overlooked. Some patient safety
advocates have encouraged the adoption of technologies, such as
computerized physician order entry systems, electronic medical
records, and bar coding. While these approaches may prove
helpful, others warn that technological solutions may themselves
create new problems. In short, the last five years have taught us
that patient safety issues are complex and need a multitude of
approaches and sustained interventions.

In the subsequent chapters we explore the lessons learned from a
four year rural patient safety initiative supported by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The findings from this
project, conducted among 30 rural hospitals in a multi-state area,
help us understand some of the barriers that hinder the provision of
safe care. This manual also provides a case-based curriculum that
was rated, by participating rural healthcare providers, as practical
and responsive to their needs and concerns.

Chapter 1
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What is an error?

O

ur research has proven that it is quite difficult to define
“error” in a way that is acceptable to all stakeholders.
Indeed, what may be viewed as an error by one healthcare
provider may be characterized as a sub-optimal event, practice
variance, or even clinical judgment by another. At times the
designation of an event as an “error” is dependent on the outcome whether harm occurred or was avoided. As one healthcare
provider explained: “errors may be more difficult to recognize
unless the patient has an adverse reaction/event from the error.
Without a reaction, healthcare providers just categorize various
incidents as “complications.”

“Things
always look
different from
different
perspectives.
The 'view'
also depends
on how close
you are to the
error.”
~ CEO

Even when there appears to be agreement about definitions, there
may not be agreement about how to solve or disclose the errors.
This profound lack of agreement among healthcare providers was
exemplified in one of our surveys when we presented two
scenarios and asked healthcare providers to respond to three
questions:
(1)

Did an error occur?

(2)

Would you report it?

(3)

Would you tell the patient about it?

The first scenario depicted a case where a physician ordered 10 units
of insulin for a diabetic patient; the nurse interpreted the order as 20
units. An overwhelming majority of our respondents indicated that
an error had occurred (98%) and they would report it (96%).
However, only 64% of the respondents would tell the patient about
this error.

In the second scenario, an 83-year old male was diagnosed with
atrial fibrillation and was admitted to the hospital for evaluation.
His heart rate was controlled, he was started on Heparin and
Coumadin, and when his INR reached a value of 2.5, he was
discharged on a Coumadin dose of 5 mg/day. No follow-up lab
tests were done or ordered before the patient's scheduled visit to
the clinic in 3 weeks. He came to ER one day before the
scheduled visit with an INR of 14.7 and pain from an expanding
spontaneous hematoma of his thigh.
Chapter 2
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What is an error? (continued)

W

hen healthcare providers responded to this second
scenario, they showed less agreement. Only 68% of our
respondents indicated that they believe an error has
occurred; 75% would report it, and slightly more than half of them
(54%) would tell the patient about it.

“You see it in
the medical
staff peer
review all the
time -- it's
just a
variation in
care, not an
error. There
seems to
always be
justification.
” ~ Nurse

The responses to these vignettes show why it is so important to
achieve a shared understanding of what constitutes an error.
Scholars and patient safety organizations have developed
definitions of a medical error, an adverse event, and a near miss.
Below are some commonly suggested definitions.

Definitions of Error
The Institute of Medicine and Agency of Healthcare Research &
Quality offer the following definitions:

?
?
?
?

An error: the failure of a planned action to be completed as
intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a
wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., an error of
planning).
Adverse event: injury caused by medical care rather than
underlying disease.
Medical error: planned action is not completed as planned,
or the wrong plan is used.
Near miss: when a medical error is corrected before
reaching the patient.

Other definitions have also been offered. Lucien Leape, one of
the pioneers of the patient safety movement, defines error as an
unintended act (either of omission or commission) or one that
does not achieve its intended outcome. The Joint Commission's
definition is similar to Leape’s and defines error as: an unintended
act, either of omission or commission, or an act that does not
achieve its outcome. The Dana Farber Cancer Institute defines
error as an event or act of commission or omission with
unintended, potentially negative consequences for the patient.

Chapter 2
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What is an error? (continued)

M

edical errors can be classified according to types of
errors, such as diagnostic, treatment, or prevention
errors. Any of these errors could be the result of
deficiencies in knowledge, judgment, external systems, inadequate
staffing, poor documentation, improper supervision,
miscommunication, or inadequate follow-up. Characterizations of
these errors are listed below.

“I'm not sure
we're aware
of the
amount of
errors. I
know what
I do, but I
am not
aware of
what
happens
with other
physicians.”
~ Physician

Diagnostic errors

?
?
?
?

Error or delay in diagnosis;
Failure to employ indicated tests;
Use of outmoded tests or therapy;
Failure to act on results of monitoring or testing.

Treatment errors

?
?
?
?
?

Error in the performance of an operation, procedure or test;
Error in administering the treatment;
Error in the dose or method of using a drug;
Avoidable delay in treatment or in responding to an
abnormal test;
Inappropriate (not indicated) care.

Prevention errors

?
?

Failure to provide prophylactic treatment;
Inadequate or monitoring of follow-up of treatment.

Other errors

?
?
?

Failure of communication;
Equipment failure;
Other system failure.

Chapter 2
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What is an error? (continued)

T

he National Coordinating Council for Medication Errors
and Prevention has approved the following working
definitions specifically for medication errors.

“Dealing
with difficult
people in
follow-up
discourages
some people
from
initiating the
error
reporting
process.”

Medication error: Any preventable event that may cause
or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient
harm while the medication is in the control of the
healthcare professional, patient or consumer. Such
events may be related to professional practice,
healthcare products, procedures or systems
including prescribing, order communication,
product labeling, packaging and nomenclature,
compounding, dispensing, distribution,
administration, education, monitoring, and use.
Adverse drug event: An adverse drug event is any injury
resulting from a medical intervention related to a
drug. Examples of such injuries include heart
rhythm disturbances, diarrhea, fever, nausea,
vomiting, renal failure, mental confusion, rash, low
blood pressure, and bleeding.

Medication errors can occur at any stage of medication
administration. These include:

~ Pharmacist

?
?

Ordering: wrong dose or wrong choice of drug;

?

Dispensing: drug not sent in time to be administered at
the time ordered, wrong drug, wrong dose;

?

Administering: wrong dose of drug administered, wrong
technique used to administer the drug; and

?

Monitoring: not noting the effects of a given medication.

Transcribing: wrong frequency of drug administration;
missed dose because the medication is not
transcribed;

Other medication errors

?
?
?

Failure of communication;
Equipment failure;
Other system failure.

Chapter 2
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What is an error? (continued)

Issues to think about and discuss with your colleagues:

“No one is
against
patient
safety; it’s
what fire do
you put out
first? “
~ Physician

 Consider the quotes in the margin on each page. Do you hear
similar statements in your hospital?
 Do you think there is room for improvement in your hospital's
policies or approaches to error?
 Consider the scenarios on page four. How would those
situations be handled in your hospital?
 Do you have a process to identify all the different kinds of
errors (medication, diagnosis, and treatment) that may occur in
your hospital?
 When a problem occurs is there a system-wide effort to find
out what happened and why?
 If so, is there a system for taking action? Who is part of that
process?

Chapter 2
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Lessons Learned: Patient Safety in Rural Settings

W

hen we began the rural patient safety project in 2001,
little was known about the status of patient safety efforts
in rural areas or the extent to which urban interventions
could be transplanted into rural settings. Our research focused on
the working conditions in rural healthcare settings and the factors
that shape recognition, reporting, disclosure, and resolution of
patient safety issues, including errors and adverse events. The
study was designed to help rural healthcare providers identify what
kinds of errors are most likely to occur, how such problems can be
discussed and resolved, and what kinds of resources might be most
helpful.

“The biggest
challenge is
making and
taking the
time to make
patient safety
a priority.”
~ CEO

Description of the Research
At the start of this 4-year rural patient safety study we created, in
each hospital, interdisciplinary teams of three to five healthcare
providers (physician, nurse, pharmacist, and administrators
including quality control personnel). One team member served as
a key contact. The participants worked in 30 hospitals in a 9state area of the rural west. A geographic area of this size met
two important criteria: it ensured the anonymity of the
participating hospitals and permitted us to study safety issues
across different systems. In accordance with results of previous
research, the participating hospitals were representative of those
found in states with large rural populations; they included acute
care facilities (69%), or a combination of acute and long-term
care facilities (31%). The majority of hospitals (76%) had fewer
than 50 acute care beds. Although most hospitals had an on-site
pharmacy (83%), only 35% have an on-site pharmacist full-time.
More than half (52%) of the hospitals did not have JCAHO
accreditation (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations); almost half did not have an ethics committee. All
of the hospitals had access to the internet.
The research agenda included eight sub-studies. As an initial
activity, the key contact completed a hospital data sheet that
provided basic information about the structure, size, and resources
available at each hospital. All team members then completed two
surveys: the Close Call Pilot Culture Assessment Instrument
developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs National Center
for Patient Safety, and an open-ended Error Assessment Tool
developed by the project investigators. Other studies included
quarterly interviews with the key contacts in each hospital, online/e-mail questionnaires, analysis of responses to case studies, a
staff-wide patient safety survey, and a final evaluation survey.

Chapter 3
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Lessons Learned: Patient Safety in Rural Settings (continued)

E

“Training is a
barrier to
safety. Time
and money
are required.
Education of
staff is
lacking as we
have no
opportunity
to meet as an
aggregate
body.”
~ Nurse

ach study provided some very specific information. Data
from the Culture Assessment Survey provided an overview
of participants' perceptions and attitudes toward patient
safety. The data indicate that the sample is well-balanced
consisting of healthcare providers with, on average, 20-year
careers in healthcare care, and approximately 11 years of
experience in their healthcare facilities. The majority of all
respondents indicated high satisfaction with their jobs and a high
level of concern about patient safety. Most indicated they were
“proud” to be working for their facility and believed they had a
personal impact on increasing patient safety. Most also believed
their facilities were genuinely concerned about patient safety.

The Error Assessment Tool provided a way to expand the
theoretical ratings of attitudes and behaviors and obtain data
relative to actual practices regarding what was recognized as an
error and what was reported. The interviews provided the
opportunity to discuss, in greater depth, the kinds of patient safety
issues that developed in each hospital and the processes used to
respond to them. The e-mail questionnaires allowed us to explore
information about specific issues, such as pharmacy protocols
when physician orders for patients seemed questionable or
erroneous. The case studies and companion questions, e-mailed
to all team members on a regular basis, helped identify the kinds
of events that are recognized as errors and what might be done to
respond to them.

As data emerged and were analyzed, results and resources were
shared with participating team members in each hospital via a web
site and ongoing e-mails. This approach helped us forge an
ongoing relationship with the research sites and helped inform and
shape each successive study. The success of this approach was
evidenced by that fact that after nearly four years, none of the
original hospitals had left the study, new hospitals had joined, and
healthcare providers remained actively engaged in a dialogue
across settings.
Chapter 3
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Lessons Learned: Patient Safety in Rural Settings (continued)
What We Learned
Our findings can be grouped into three major categories:
(1)
Working Conditions And Professional Barriers that
impact the development of a culture of safety;
(2)
Internal And External System Or Organizational Barriers
that impact the adoption of interventions;
(3)
Individual Level Barriers related to cognitive perceptions
of errors and behavioral responses to errors.

“Dialogue is
a problem;,
we don't
share
previous
errors as a
learning
experience.”
~ Physician

Working Conditions Barriers:
Rural healthcare providers consistently note the theoretical
importance of safety. However, lack of time and lack of
interdisciplinary communication as well as associated issues such
as unequal power relationships, hierarchical decision-making,
lack of interdisciplinary interaction, and lack of feedback on error
reporting, all emerged as serious barriers to patient safety. These
barriers contribute to a culture in which the lack of shared
experiences becomes the norm. These conditions result in
fundamental differences within and among the professions in
areas such as agreement and recognition of errors, development
of protocols for reporting, and attribution of responsibility for
ensuring patient safety.

Internal System Barriers: Most rural hospitals lack formal or
mandatory systems for reporting close calls, errors, and adverse
events. Most rural healthcare providers have never participated in
formal error analysis activities like Root Cause Analysis (RCA) or
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA). Most also report
inconsistent opportunities for participation in any other error
analysis process. In general, feedback mechanisms relative to
error are not well established. Indeed, most healthcare providers
lacked familiarity with their hospitals' safety program. Moreover,
even when safety systems are in place and errors are recognized,
recognition and reporting are typically limited to medicationrelated errors and adverse events. This focus on medication errors
is so linked to patient safety that other kinds of errors such as those
associated with diagnosis and treatment are rarely recognized,
discussed, or reported.
Chapter 3
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Lessons Learned: Patient Safety in Rural Settings (continued)

M
“Right now,
without a
facilityaccepted
definition of
a medical
error, I
believe this
environment
makes it more
difficult to
address
medical errors
as some seem
to "minimize"
the error and
therefore
little, if any,
corrective
action is
implemented”
~ CEO

ost healthcare providers also reported inconsistencies in
staffing patterns, and use of part time or “locum” staff.
The use of part-time staff as well as the hiring
arrangements for physicians seem to be issues that require further
investigation. For example, when the physicians are employed by
the hospital, the hospital appears to have some control over the
physician's adherence to standards and protocols. But when the
physicians are self employed and merely maintain hospital
privileges, hospital control over behavior is considerably
diminished. These patterns make it difficult to sustain
organizational protocols for patient safety that go beyond
medication related errors. In this kind of an environment, it is not
surprising that the healthcare providers who promote safety or
report errors are seen as “picky” or unduly critical or
organizationally insensitive.

External System Barriers: Healthcare providers consistently
reported limited access to appropriate guides, standards, and
patient safety resources. They noted that most clinical guides are
written for specialists, while they are generalists. They also
reported that the technological interventions designed for large
institutions may not fit the scales of economy of small places.

Individual Level Barriers: Our data suggest there is a fundamental
misalignment between what people believe and what they actually
do when faced with patient safety issues. This split between
cognition and behavior makes it difficult for rural healthcare
providers to consistently recognize and respond to unsafe
situations. Thus even when healthcare providers report a
willingness to take action when encountering unsafe situations,
they do not consistently recognize, disclose, or agree on other
appropriate responses when action is required.
The DVA Close Call Culture Assessment provided important
insights relative to healthcare providers' perceptions about patient
safety and error reporting in their healthcare settings. On one
level, the information was very encouraging. A majority of the
team members indicated their facility leadership does not punish
people who report safety discrepancies (on a 5-point scale, ranging
from disagree strongly to agree strongly; 71% agreed strongly, and
Chapter 3
Page 13

Patient Safety in Rural Settings
Lessons Learned: Patient Safety in Rural Settings (continued)
23% agreed slightly). All of the team members agreed, to some
extent, that their healthcare settings were genuinely concerned
about safety (71% agreed strongly, 29% agreed slightly) and most
of them also agreed that they have an effect on work safety (80%
strongly, 17% slightly).

“So you
sometimes let
things go on
because you
are dealing
with people's
opinions and
it's a
challenge.
You don't
ignore but not
much
happens.”
~Nurse

Moreover, a majority of the team members agreed with the
statement that when somebody else makes a mistake, they would
like to know about it, so they would not make the same mistake
(51% agreed strongly and 32% slightly). Correspondingly, a
majority of them agreed that their job performance has improved
as a result of learning about mistakes made by other staff members
(26% agreed strongly, and 52% agreed slightly). Most disagreed
(63% strongly, 28% slightly) with a statement that seeing a
coworker making a mistake would negatively affect their respect
for that coworker.

Finally, more than half of them believed that within their facility,
good communication flow exists up and down the chain of
command (19% agreed strongly, 43% slightly). In general,
respondents appear more positive than neutral or negative when
rating all of these issues. However, the significant differences
among those who agreed slightly as opposed to strongly when
rating good communication flow as well as learning from the
mistakes of others, suggest there may be some concerns.

Similar findings emerged when analyzing data from the Staff
Patient Safety Survey. This survey was conducted among staff in
the participating hospitals. The majority of respondents offered
positive ratings with respect to their institutional culture on patient
safety and error. Most believed that the culture in their hospital is
“anyone can make mistakes” (65%), and that the error reporting
system is open to all employees (86%), confidential (70%), and
impartial (56%). Moreover, the majority of the staff reported they
felt comfortable (65%) or somewhat comfortable (32%) discussing
the topic of medical errors.
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T
“But I have
to admit it's
difficult to
convince
other folks.
Because
when
everything
turns out ok,
they don't
question the
standard of
care. They
don't seem to
get that
issue.”
~ Pharmacist

he above findings suggest a positive and proactive
environment. However, data from the Error Reporting Tool
(consisting of 8 open-ended questions) suggest that rural
healthcare providers have had limited exposure to medical errors.
Most report they have encountered only medication-related errors
(the wrong time, dose, drug, or mode of delivery), patient falls, and
illegible handwriting. Their experiences with reporting and
charting errors were limited to these same types.
Similar findings emerged when conducting quarterly interviews.
Key contacts detailed organizational efforts to reduce medication
errors and to a lesser degree, patient falls. They also identified
these two areas as issues they would continue to prioritize in their
hospitals. Similar findings emerged again when the team members
responded to case studies that depicted the kinds of medicationrelated errors described as most prevalent in the Error Reporting
Tool and most frequent in the Staff Patient Safety Survey.
Healthcare providers generally recognized them, identified them as
errors, indicated they should be documented via incident reports or
in the patient chart, and suggested strategies that would improve
patient care.

However, when given case studies that showed any other kind of
error, such as diagnoses or treatment errors, there was no
agreement about the nature of the incident. Nor was there
agreement about how such errors should be resolved, charted, or
disclosed. Moreover, when asked about other types of errors
during quarterly interviews, the healthcare providers uniformly
reported that they had “not gone there yet.” One healthcare
provider explained: “Many times other errors may be more
serious than the medication error, but they are more difficult to
detect; for example a missed treatment is not immediately visible
to an oncoming nurse, whereas, in our system, a medication not
dispensed at the appropriate time is still in the patient's 'med
drawer'".
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What this means
This patient safety study was designed to assess the kinds of
patient safety issues that develop in rural settings and identify the
conditions, including working conditions, under which system
change can occur. This is a complex and challenging agenda. If
we had conducted only one or two studies, for example a pre- and
post test, we might not have gained sufficient knowledge about the
degree to which errors are recognized, the extent of the differences
in perceptions among the professions, differences in attribution of
responsibility, and the multiple factors that hinder willingness to
take corrective action.

“To the
pharmacist it
was as clear
as the nose on
your face but
to a nurse,
clear as
mud.”
~ Quality
Control

For example, in all of the studies, healthcare providers consistently
acknowledged the importance of patient safety. But given the
kinds of error that are most often recognized in rural settings, most
healthcare providers also believed that primary responsibility for
safety rested on the shoulders of nurses. It was harder for the
participants in this study to attribute responsibility to other
professions when potential errors were unrecognized or when
repercussions hindered willingness to recognize or report.

Our data suggest that three key conditions must be met in order
for system change to occur:
(1)
(2)
(3)

shared recognition of unsafe practices;
belief that the consequences of such recognition can be
handled;
belief that organizational changes, or corrective
actions, are possible and will occur.

If any one of these conditions is not met, resistance to any kind of
intervention or action is heightened. The extent to which these
conditions influence behavior was showcased by a nurse in our
study who had attended a seminar on prevention of wrong site
surgery. Soon thereafter she was assisting during a surgery when
she and other staff suspected that the surgeon might be operating
on the wrong knee. In spite of her recent training and this
nagging doubt she and her colleagues did not have the courage to
challenge the physician.
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T

he patient safety literature calls for the creation of a culture
of safety. To achieve such a culture in rural settings serious
barriers or conditions have to be overcome. For example,
the resource scarcities that are pervasive in rural areas can easily
deter a willingness to recognize unsafe situations or take corrective
action. Rural healthcare providers frequently talked about “being
one doctor away from disaster.” The fear of implementing
unpopular practices that could result in the loss of a physician or
other essential healthcare provider can jeopardize the willingness
to develop or sustain patient safety initiatives. This hesitancy to
take action, however, can create serious consequences for those
who seek to provide care and for those who receive it.

“People
were
confused
about what
dilemmas
were, who
they called.
There were
some gaps.”
~ CEO

The relationship between recognition of error, belief that
consequences can be handled, and belief that the system will
change was evidenced in several of our studies. For example,
when interviewed, nurses often expressed reluctance to
acknowledge medical errors. They noted that it was not within
their scope to question doctors. They reported that when mistakes
occurred, they were to make certain that problems were fixed, but
not necessarily reported. If nurses did report errors, they noted
that the usual procedure was then to have the issue referred to the
M&M and the medical staff; rarely did they receive any feedback
on their reporting. And so, in a sense, they did not look for
medical errors.
Administrators also encountered some barriers. They reported
that they often lacked the medical knowledge or the clinical
judgment to question diagnosis and treatment issues. Thus they
generally rely on the physicians to solve “their own problems.”
Physicians reported that they rarely “looked over each others'
shoulders.” Pharmacists acknowledged that they, when
necessary, have changed incorrect orders from physicians and
also noted that those incorrect orders were never regarded as
mistakes or errors. As one reported: “Our doctors don’t view
those as errors.”
These conditions create an environment in which it takes great
insight and courage to recognize and report errors or advocate
adoption of patient safety practices. Just moving from nonrecognition to recognition is an important achievement and an
essential first step toward change.
Chapter 3
Page 17

Patient Safety in Rural Settings
Lessons Learned: Patient Safety in Rural Settings (continued)

T

he findings from our study underscore the need for both
interdisciplinary efforts as well as multi-method approaches
in order to fully explore and respond to the conditions that
influence patient safety in rural healthcare settings. Our findings
suggest that rural healthcare settings need change agents to drive
the pursuit of safe practices. The change agents, in turn, require
ongoing feedback and strong institutional support for patient safety
efforts.

“We are now
looking at
more than
medication
errors. This
project has
prepared us
to go deeper.
We really
depend on
you.”
~ Director of
Nursing

By continuously sharing the results from the different studies we
created the conditions that supported the examination of
perceptions and behaviors that influence the ability of healthcare
providers to provide safe care. This feedback loop kept
participants involved and helped them see gaps in the quality of
care. This method also served as a reality test. For example, after
participating in project activities, pharmacists and administrators
observed that their hospital data on errors were probably not
accurate. Nurses and physicians noted their surprise at
discovering the extent of their professional differences in
recognizing, approaching, and resolving patient safety issues.

A key issue, and one that requires serious attention, involves the
attribution of responsibility for patient safety to nurses. Most
healthcare providers believed that patient safety was primarily the
responsibility of nurses. In part that perception may reflect the
limited scope of what traditionally constitutes an error
(medication) in most rural settings. Thus when the nurse gives the
wrong dose it is recognized as an error. However, when a
physician orders a wrong dose, the pharmacist corrects the mistake
and it is not then viewed as an error. In this context, most of the
errors are more easily attributed to the nursing staff, and so
responsibility for patient safety and reporting falls within the realm
of the nursing role. This orientation has not encouraged a thorough
examination or appreciation of the scope of the patient safety
problem. This finding was evidenced by data from the patient
safety staff survey that showed that the same kinds of errors
reoccur with some frequency.
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I

t can be hard to know what kinds of resources will help
healthcare providers respond to the issues we have discussed
thus far. After some trial and error, we developed a casebased curriculum. This curriculum seemed to overcome some of
the barriers that have discouraged system-wide examination of
patient safety issues in rural areas.

“There's a lot
of curbside
communicati
on but it
doesn't go
over well for
the nurse to
tell the
physician
about
practices.”
~ CEO

To develop the curriculum, we worked closely with participants so
as to identify situations that occurred with some frequency in rural
hospitals. We then depicted these issues in short, tightly woven
case studies and asked healthcare providers to respond to a series
of questions. As healthcare providers examined and responded to
these familiar situations, they became aware of professional
differences that inhibited recognition and resolution of errors and
compromised the overall quality of safe care.

Throughout the research cycle we learned the importance of
sensitivity, on the part of the researchers and participants, to the
choice of words. Through our previous studies on ethics and rural
healthcare we had learned that a direct question about the kinds of
ethical issues that occur in rural settings was often met with
silence. Rural healthcare providers did not typically identify
issues as “ethical.” So in order to discern what ethical issues
might look like in the rural context, we had to re-phrase the
questions and make them less academic. We learned to ask about
values and beliefs and rules for living in their communities rather
than about “ethics.”

Likewise, when we first began asking the participants in this
patient safety project to identify the errors depicted in each case
study, the healthcare providers were extremely hesitant to
designate issues as errors. Recognizing the importance of
language, we tried to adopt more neutral, or value-free language.
The hesitancy to respond was immediately dispelled when we
began to ask the participants whether an event similar to the one
depicted in the case could occur, or had occurred, in the
participants' own settings. Again and again we heard the question:
“Were you here last week?”
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T

o further encourage a neutral examination of issues, we
developed a standard template for case analysis. The
template included questions about the following areas:

?
?
?
?
“It's trying to
take it all
and
implement it.
It's a real
shift into
new
processes. It
has really
raised our
awareness.
Trying to get
there is a
push but we
will get
there.”
~ Nurse

?

The central topic in each case study;
The key issues;
The learning points;
The clinical guides and standards that should or could be
applied; and
The strategies for improvement.

This approach encouraged dialogue and seemed to help the
healthcare providers overcome the personal, professional, and
system-level barriers associated with identifying errors or unsafe
practices. This recognition and dialogue were important steps in
advancing a culture of safety.

Issues to think about and discuss with your colleagues:









Do you believe the culture and working conditions in your
hospital promote or undermine patient safety?
Would you be comfortable sharing your definition of error
with patients and members of your community?
Are there opportunities for interdisciplinary and/or interprofessional collaboration in your hospital?
To what extent is the patient or family a member of the
decision-making team? Is there room for improvement?
What would you define as the barriers in your hospital to
achieving safer care?
Patient safety theorists say that what happens after an
injury is as important as what happens before the injury.
Discuss what this means in relation to your healthcare
setting.
Are the healthcare providers in your setting aware of
professional differences regarding definitions and
handling of errors and adverse events?
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T

he data from all of the sub-studies underscore the fact that
rural healthcare providers want to provide safe care. They
are committed to their communities and want activities that
help them:
(1) recognize errors, adverse events, and near misses;
(2) devise ways to report such activities, and
(3) reduce errors and solve pro-actively those that do occur.

“I like the
case studies
for use at inservices for
the nursing
staff because
they could
happen at
our place on
any given
day.”
~ Nurse

Most research participants expressed positive beliefs about the
importance of reporting errors as well as positive experiences
when reporting errors. They noted the importance of constructive
feedback and system-wide efforts that focus on education and
training, staffing and scheduling, and better communication. As
one nurse noted, in order to make changes “you have to know what
you don't know.”

But as our data show a number of barriers impede the ability of
healthcare providers “to know what we don’t know.” On a
cognitive level, words like “error” and “mistake” can create
strong reactions that leave lingering and painful memories. The
emotional burden associated with the word “error” and the
memories of painful events can hinder or prevent dialogue. On a
behavioral level, new approaches can feel threatening or
uncomfortable. And on an organizational level, the task of
system change can seem almost overwhelming, a relentless
burden of too little time, resources, and skills.

We became aware of this burden when, in nearly every
conversation with rural healthcare providers, they underscored how
busy their lives were. Staff shortages and the use of temporary or
part-time staff hamper consistent efforts to standardize care and
ensure adequate communication. In addition, professional
expectations and traditions limited the amount of dialogue that
healthcare providers have with one another. Nurses noted that it
was often difficult to arrange conversations with physicians. Since
rural nurses do not uniformly accompany physicians during their
rounds, nurses were not sure what a physician told an individual
patient. Technologic interventions such as taped reports at shift
changes decreased the dialogue among the nursing staff. In many
cases, staff meetings are no longer held on a regular basis. To add
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to these challenges, purchasing educational resources such as
videos, participating in national organizations, and attending
national seminars can seem, especially for a resource limited
facility, too costly. And even when money is not a matter of
concern, content and focus are often poorly aligned with the rural
context. Said one nurse: “the patient safety conference was very
interesting and seemed useful, but when I tried to implement some
of the ideas in my rural setting, nothing really worked.”

“Definitely,
during busy
days or busy
hours of a
day, our
nurses may be
pulled in all
directions.
To me, this
leads to
increased
chance for
error.”
~ Quality
Control

The time constraints reported by rural healthcare providers are
exacerbated by the power imbalances and professional beliefs
about role and scope of work. As noted in the previous section,
rural healthcare providers talk about “being one doctor away from
disaster.” Just the fear of losing a physician can jeopardize the
development or implementation of patient safety initiatives.
Members of the nursing staff expressed reluctance to
acknowledge diagnosis and treatment errors. They observed that
it was not within their scope to question doctors. When
encountering mistakes, they were to make certain that problems
were fixed, but not necessarily reported. If nurses did report, they
said that the usual procedure was to have the issue referred to the
M&M and the medical staff; rarely did they receive any feedback
on their reporting.
Administrators said they did not have the medical knowledge to
question diagnosis and treatment issues and so had to rely on the
physicians to solve “their own problems.” Physicians reported
that they rarely “looked over each others' shoulders.”
Pharmacists, who acknowledged that they frequently changed
incorrect orders from physicians, also noted that those incorrect
orders were never regarded as mistakes or errors. These
conditions create an environment in which it takes great courage
to recognize and report errors or advocate adoption of patient
safety practices. Just moving from non-recognition to recognition
is a huge achievement and an essential first step toward change.
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T

“We are all
comfortable,
but, people do
get defensive
if it involves
them.”
~ Pharmacist

hese environmental factors help us understand why, though
there seem to be many patient safety resources available,
their use in rural settings was limited. When we began the
patient safety study, we created a curriculum accessible via a
secure web site for all participants. The curriculum contained a
variety of resources including case studies, articles, definitions,
links to clinical standards and other patient safety resources. When
healthcare providers accessed the secure website, they noted the
value and relevance of the curriculum. But they also noted that
they did not access the site on a regular basis. On a busy day,
healthcare providers reported that they did not have the time to
look for new information. New information did not seem like as
much of a priority as the present emergency. And so weeks would
pass, and the relevance of patient safety, as a daily concern,
diminished.

In order to make it possible for healthcare providers to focus on
patient safety, the intervention had to be designed so that it would
be easy to implement. At the outset we had to show the
discrepancy between the beliefs about the safety of care in one's
hospital and actual occurrences. We had to show that increased
dialogue and collaboration might offer important benefits. We
had to find a methodology for ongoing education and training that
was culturally compatible since conferences, books, journals,
seminars, and even websites did not seem to be very well
accepted or at least used with any frequency. We had to identify
environmental issues that might compromise patient safety.
Finally, we had to identify rules, policies, and procedures that
support adoption of safe practices.
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“Each of us
plays the
blame game
to our
advantage.
Few facilities
truly
constitute a
team
orientation”
~ CEO

Creating a model
In order to adjust to those various constraints and make it easier for
healthcare providers to actively participate in the patient safety
initiative, we redesigned the curriculum. We presented patient
safety issues, as well as important concepts, definitions, standards,
and other resources via succinct, tightly structured case studies.
The case studies were e-mailed to participants on a weekly basis.
This format evolved as a collaborative effort among team
members, researchers, and a patient safety team at Rush Medical
College in Chicago. The study participants provided examples of
problematic and potentially harmful situations, and the researchers
then shaped them into case studies. The format was pilot tested
and revised as needed. Over the course of the project, the case
studies progressed from depicting the kinds of problems most
typically identified as problematic (medication errors and patient
falls) to less easily recognized problems (diagnosis and treatment
errors).

Upon receiving the case study, the research participants were
asked to respond to a series of questions. The questions also went
through a series of revisions. When we initially asked if the case
contained an error, the healthcare providers were reluctant to
identify it as such, even when the case included errors that met
the IOM criteria and definition of error. To overcome this
reluctance we began asking if the depicted situation had happened
or could happen in their settings.

We then created a standardized format and asked the participants to
analyze each case study by identifying the topic, issues, learning
points, clinical guides and standards, and room for improvement.
The responses were summarized, shared with the participants, and
were posted on the secure website. Participants were also asked to
disseminate the case studies and summaries to staff in their
hospitals for further discussion, dialogue, and action.

Chapter 4
Page 25

Patient Safety in Rural Settings
What Might Help (continued)
“Each member
in the
medication
process has
expectations of
the others. The
nurse and
pharmacist
expect the
doctor to write
the correct
orders. The
pharmacist
expects the
nurse to double
check
medications
prior to giving,
and the nurse
expects the
pharmacist to
dispense the
correct drug
and dose.
These
expectations
lead to less
dialogue
secondary to
assumptions
that the other
person
completed their
part correctly.”
~ CEO

T

he case studies helped healthcare providers realize the
discrepancies between their perceptions and their behaviors,
between what they thought about error and what they did
when unsafe situations occurred. Healthcare providers uniformly
agreed that they did not realize the extent to which the lack of
shared perspectives, definitions, words, experiences, and traditions
hindered recognition of error and compromised patient safety.
The structure of this dialogue process-the exploratory questions at
the end of a case description, the evaluation framework used by
the participants, and the “rules of discourse”-does more than
provide an open forum for differing opinions. This iterative
process elicits input about the context and the incident that may
not have been recognized n the first analysis. The back-and-forth
communication and argument with others enables all participants
to agree on a concise, explanatory account of what happened,
why it happened, and how it happened.

The case studies and summaries proved to be the most valuable
resources offered during the study. Indeed 95% of the respondents
to the project evaluation indicated that they read the case studies.
Some hospitals joined the study just so that they could receive the
case studies. The case studies were short and tightly focused. This
format responded to the time constraints that impede the
participation of healthcare providers in any educational activity.
The e-mail format was efficient and accessible; the arrival of a
weekly case study helped keep patient safety on the radar screen.
Participants forwarded the case studies to other members of the
staff, placed them on bulletin boards, and left them at nursing
stations. The case studies seemed to facilitate interdisciplinary
collaboration. Some hospitals scheduled educational seminars for
physicians and nurses during which the case studies were
presented for discussion.
Throughout the course of the study, the participants were given
feedback and reports of the findings from all the sub-studies. This
allowed the team members from each hospital to compare
perceptions with actual findings and gauge progress toward the
development of a culture of safety.
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Issues to think about and discuss with your colleagues:

“I’m really
shocked by
our
differences.
I’m not sure
we are
speaking the
same
language..”
~ Nurse



To what extent does your organization facilitate or inhibit
collaborative education of healthcare professionals?



Are there organizational or system-level practices that
increase the likelihood of errors?



Is there agreement among all staff about issues such as:
=
Quality of care
=
Error reporting
=
Attribution of responsibility
=
Lines of responsibility
=
Lines of communication



How do you describe your role in achieving a safe
healthcare environment?



Organizational beliefs can shape the culture of safety.
Consider the following:
=
The balance of power concentrated versus shared
=
Beliefs about conflict
=
Leadership and personal responsibility
=
Attitudes toward change
=
Belief that hazard and risk cannot be reduced
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E

“We feel
we
disappoint
the
profession,
when we
make
errors. I
have had
this on my
shoulders
for 14
years.”
~ Physician

rrors and adverse events cause harm, create the need for
further intervention, and diminish trust in the healthcare
system. Given the statistics cited in the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report and in many subsequent publications, the
call for a change in attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, and practices is an
urgent one. The IOM refers to this as a shift from a culture of error
to a culture of safety. When we create a culture of safety, we
“make it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for people
to do the right thing.”

Doing the right thing sounds like a pretty straightforward task.
But if cultural change is so easy to accomplish, healthcare would
become much safer with each year that passes. However, in spite
of so much effort and good intent, patient safety experts now
realize that we are far from the 5-year IOM goal of reducing error
by 50%. Our failure to reach that goal shows us that change is
very difficult to accomplish. We hone our beliefs, attitudes,
behaviors, and practices throughout our lives. We develop coping
skills and patterns of interaction. We develop our comfort zones
both as professionals and as individuals.

Moving from our comfort zones can create cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance arises when there is tension between one's
attitudes, emotions, beliefs, and values. As human beings we want
to avoid cognitive dissonance and one coping mechanism is denial.
When asked, most healthcare providers ardently hold that the
healthcare they provide is the safest around. So, admitting that
healthcare in one's hospital is not safe violates the healthcare
providers’ core beliefs about what they do and how they do it.
Likewise, the acknowledgment of medical errors directly assails
several fundamental beliefs such as: one has control over one's
destiny, care in one's hospital is safe, technology and science are
forces of progress, risks necessary for the good life are acceptable,
and experts know best. It is not easy to discard such beliefs.

Chapter 5
Page 29

Patient Safety in Rural Settings
Making healthcare safer: What does it take? (continued)
In our studies we have found that when problems occur, healthcare
providers will only take action, or overcome cognitive dissonance,
if three conditions are met. These conditions can be thought of as
the three legs of a milk stool and if any one of these legs is
missing, the possibility for taking any action is unlikely. The three
legs are:

“The
physician
was
amazed
that we
told the
patient
right away
about the
error, and
didn’t
charge for
ICU.”
~ Nurse

?
?
?

Recognition of a problem;
Belief in one's ability to handle consequences of action;
Belief that change can occur.

Setting the stage
Given the discussion so far, imagine the barriers that arise when
trying to change any behaviors. One can promise to quit
smoking, or to increase physical activity, or to exclude junk food
from one's menu. But, as most people know, the best of
intentions are often derailed by old behaviors. Old behaviors are
not inherently bad. In many ways our habits and behaviors make
life predictable and give us survival skills and protection against
stress. Following a routine reduces the number of decisions one
has to make. Given these realities, even small and seemingly
insignificant changes can be stressful. Imagine a change as
straightforward as taking a different route to work every day for a
month. The task may not initially seem stressful; in fact, on the
first day it may seem quite easy. But as the days pass, one's
stress level will increase.
So even if one understands the need for change and wants to
achieve change, roadblocks will be encountered! Today's rural
healthcare providers encounter a steady stream of new
developments, expectations, and technologies that require
frequent changes on many levels. In such an environment it can
be very hard, even with the best of intentions, to keep patient
safety “on the radar screen.”
But change is possible. During the four years of this study, we
forged an ongoing relationship with the research sites. And
during that time healthcare providers changed attitudes,
expectations, and behaviors.
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O

ur data show that in order to keep patient safety on the
radar screen, we have to consistently support the
behavioral processes that help people respond to the
problems they encounter. According to change theorists this means
we have to choose activities that support a commitment to
changing behavior. We have to replace problem behaviors with
new behaviors. We have to avoid situations that trigger old
behaviors. We have to reward new behaviors and create helping
relationships.

“It seems
that nurses
are best at
reporting.
It’s pretty
hard to miss
a fall. And
it’s
obvious.”
~ Nurse

Stages of Change: The Process
When change occurs, a person or a system goes through a multistage process. The goal of achieving greater recognition of
errors, for example, involves helping staff move from being
aware of only limited kinds of errors to recognition of a greater
variety of events or practices that may harm patients. This
broader recognition can lead to shared perceptions and ultimately
to shared solutions. Of course one hopes that change can be
accomplished as quickly and painlessly as possible. But a recent
IOM report indicates that, in spite of concerted national efforts,
the goal of reducing errors by 50% during the past five years has
not been met. This finding underscores the reality that change is
complicated. Theorists suggest that change actually involves a 5step process.
The steps include the following:

Pre-contemplation: People in this stage are basically unaware of
their problems and have no intention to change their behavior.
Such people may feel some pressure from others, but basically are
hoping that “other people” will change. Many healthcare providers
were in this stage when the IOM report was published. They
thought their facilities were safe, that the need for major change
was exaggerated, and that the statistics offered in the IOM report
were inflated. During presentations healthcare providers
questioned those numbers and asked: “Why are you using those
statistics?”
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Making healthcare safer: What does it take? (continued)

“When it
involves
changing
things- it
gets really
hard with
some of our
people. In
rural settings
this is so
evident, you
have a
medical staff
that is very
close and
generally has
a lot of
power, and a
lot of the
staff has
been around
for a long
time, it is
hard to get
them to make
changes.”
~ CEO

Contemplation: People in this stage are aware of problems and
are serious about thinking about them sometime within the next six
months or so. They have not made a commitment to take action
for two basic reasons: (1) they may still feel quite daunted by the
scope of the problems, or (2) they may still feel positive about
some aspect of their troublesome behavior. An example of such a
scenario would be persons who are “still thinking about” quitting
smoking. In our study, for example, healthcare providers reported
that storing medication in a “med drawer” had caused some safety
problems, but it also made it easier to get medications when
needed. So change was not seriously pursued.

Preparation: Individuals in this stage intend to take action within
the next month. They may have already tried to modify some
behaviors, but these behaviors have been sporadic or only
partially effective. They may be developing strategies for a more
committed approach to change, but are still ambivalent about the
process. In our patient safety study, healthcare providers
described the effort to change or prohibit the use of certain
abbreviations or certain medications. Oftentimes these efforts
would be met with resistance. Pharmacists in several hospitals
expressed interest in starting a Coumadin clinic where they could
help patients manage their prescriptions. But they also reported
that physicians did not want to give up their management of this
drug.

Action: In this stage, people take concrete steps to change their
behavior or environment in order to resolve the problem. Scholars
studying change have found that at a given time, only 10-15% of
people who feel they are in a “change process” are in this action
phase. As participants entered this phase, many began distributing
case studies to colleagues in order to achieve dialogue and
encourage new behaviors that increase patient safety. Some
hospitals used the case studies and other resources when
conducting continuing education to their staff.
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“There's
always lip
service to it
but when it
comes down
to the rubber
hitting the
road, they
wonder how
it will impact
the
institution,
the ripple
effect. They
weigh the
risk and the
benefit and
wonder if
we're better
off putting
this to the
side.”
~ Pharmacist

Maintenance: This is the stage in which people try to consolidate
their gains and avoid relapse. Behaving in ways incompatible with
the problem is a key sign that a person has reached this stage. This
is a crucial but difficult stage. Once progress has been made and
change achieved, it is easy to think that the problem has been
solved. But success can be deceiving. One hospital provided
continuing education training on the protocols for use of Demerol.
At first, the healthcare providers adhered to the new protocols.
However, two years later the quality control coordinator
discovered that adherence to the protocols had lapsed. To avoid
relapse, maintenance has to be viewed as an on-going activity.

When seeking change remember:
?
People are not at the same stage at the same time
?
Pay attention to an individual's “stage” at a given time
?
Recognize the need to go slowly
?
Anticipate some backsliding
?
Try to do the right thing at the right time
?
Avoid inappropriate responses like shame and blame
?
Honor every stage of change

Where are you in the patient safety change process?
?
Where do you put yourself in terms of changing your own
behavior toward creating a culture of safety?
?
If you think about your hospital, where would you put it?
?
What are you willing to do to increase patient safety?
?
Who can help you with this process?
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The change process requires us to seriously examine where we are
in terms of our beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors, and where
we want to be. As we change we will:

“We are
working on a
disclosure
policy. It's a
challenge for
the medical
staff. Our
policy at this
point: don't
tell them a
thing.”
~ CEO

Move from:
?
Being unaware of problems
?
Not considering change
?
Resisting change: this can involve reluctance, rebellion,
resignation, & rationalization
?
Exclusivity: believing that patient safety involves a
specific cohort, like nursing.

Move to:
?
Increased awareness
?
Reflective listening
?
Development of choices
?
Exploration of personal, professional, and system-level
barriers
?
Acknowledgment of reasons for not changing behaviors
?
Inclusivity: patient safety involves everyone; it's not for
experts only

So, what do we do next?
First of all, it is important to identify leaders within the institution
who can champion patient safety initiatives. These leaders need to
represent all different professions and have the confidence and
trust of other staff. These leaders will help create a common
language, shared experiences, and opportunities for shared
training/education. They have to be able to model for other
healthcare providers the importance of collaboration, good
communication, and respect for others. They have to be aware of
the power imbalances among staff and patients and have the
authority to create conditions conducive to provision of safe care.
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S

ince the patient safety leaders or champions need to guide
the change process, they will need skills that facilitate and
enable constructive problem solving. Constructive problem
solving usually involves the following steps:

?
?
?
“We need to
apply it more
and move to
the next level.
We need to
figure out
what to do
next.”
~ Physician

?
?
?
?

Assessing the situation (evaluating and gathering facts,
meeting with colleagues and patients);
Beginning the change process (defining goals, disclosure,
ground rules, confidentiality);
Eliciting facts about what happens (new medication,
differential diagnoses, figuring out exactly what
happened);
Gathering information from all involved (this includes
gathering information about beliefs, feelings, emotions,
interests);
Problem solving (developing options, solutions);
Resolution (testing and evaluating the options and
solutions);
Follow up (ensuring that everything agreed on is
implemented and maintained).

Achieving patient safety is a constant challenge, one that we face
every day. The resources provided in the next section of this
manual have been designed to help healthcare providers
overcome the cognitive dissonance and other barriers that
challenge the ability or willingness to respond to this challenge.
It may make it easier for us to change behaviors when we remind
ourselves that caring for humans is a serious commitment and one
that we all seek to honor.
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Patient safety resources

T

his chapter contains examples of resources and tools that
have been extensively field tested in the participating rural
hospitals. They have been designed to encourage
interdisciplinary dialogue, to raise awareness, and to support
system change.

The following resources are included in this chapter:

“This program
is like a
constant shot
of awareness.
What a hole
if it is ever
gone. “
~ CEO

?

A Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) template. The PDSA model
has been successfully used to identify areas that require
attention and test and assess approaches that respond to
them.

?

Case studies and the analytical model used to assess them.
The cases are based on patient safety issues that,
according to participating healthcare providers, arise in
rural healthcare settings.

?

The summaries following each case study are based on the
feedback from the interdisciplinary teams in each of the
participating rural hospitals and from the interdisciplinary
patient safety team, under the direction of Dr. Robert
McNutt, at Rush Medical College. The summaries do not
offer medical or clinical recommendations. Rather they
offer a process for identifying areas that merit attention
and discussion when trying to improve patient safety.

?

Other tools that support interdisciplinary discussion and
decision making.

You are free to copy and disseminate any of the resources or tools
in this manual. You may also go to our website and access these
and other resources related to rural healthcare at:
http://www.umt.edu/bioethics. We welcome your feedback about
their use and helpfulness.
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T

he PDSA (Plan - Do - Study - Act) model is a process used
in continuous quality improvement. The PDSA model is an
effective, rapid cycle methodology that:

?
?
?
?

“I’m
responsible
for inservice, I’m
on 17
committees,
plus the
hospital is
in the
midst of a
major
addition.”
~ Nurse

Achieves interdisciplinary collaboration;
Identifies areas for quality improvement;
Provides a means to test interventions; and
Incorporates evaluation into the overall process.

PLAN: Develop the Plan
The project work plan is based on the hospital/department’s vision
and goals. Remember not all of the goals have to be achieved in
the first year. It is better to focus on what is feasible. The staff
will be encouraged by early successes, so start small and celebrate
accomplishments. Avoid an overly aggressive project work plan,
because it can be a recipe for failure.

DO: Implement the Improvement Plan
The improvement plan will first be implemented on a pilot basis
either as a time-dependent (e.g., a three month) or practicedependent (e.g., physicians A and B only) pilot and the plan will be
adjusted continuously.

STUDY: Collect Post-Intervention Data
Post-intervention data will be collected to assess if the
improvement plan worked. The base line data collection will be
repeated for a time period after the intervention process is
implemented. A difference in the aggregate gap-analysis assessed.
Improvements will be made based on the pilot test

ACT: Implement the Plan
The results will be reported to the entire staff, and the practice will
decide to implement the revised improvement plan practice-wide,
and establish a time-line for re-evaluation.

* (adapted from American Academy of Family Physicians website)
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Plan

Problems:

Observations:

What happened?

What was actually tested?

Adapted, with permission, from materials developed by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement

Where will the data be collected?

When will the data be collected?

Who will collect the data?

What data do we need to collect?

Data:

What do we expect to happen?

Predictions:

Where are we testing?

When are we testing?

Who are we testing the change on?

Test (carry out the change)
2. Collect data
3. Begin analysis
1.

Do

Study

Purpose of this PDSA cycle:

Phone #:

AddresEs-:MDaailte:

What are we testing, and who is conducting the test?

The change:

Do

Action Plan for:

Plan
Completed by:

Compare data to predictions

Summarize what was learned

Complete analysis of data

Study

GWTG Implementation Module:

Act

Are we ready to implement the
change?

What will the next test cycle
be?

What changes should we
make before the next test
cycle?

Act

Patient Safety in Rural Settings
Example of PDSA Application (continued)

“Oh, great!
Now I am
aware of
screw-ups but
what should
I do?”
~ Nurse

1A. Sample Project Timeline and Task Assignment Worksheet
Task
Date to be completed Staff assigned task
Collect data
Compile results
Analyze data - staff meeting
Collect additional data/analyze
Develop an improvement plan
Present project results and improvement plan
Implement plan on a pilot basis
Collect post-intervention data/analyze
Implement improvement practice-wid
Six-month review

The following example shows how the PDSA methodology can be
used to help your team implement various patient safety
improvements.

Objective: to improve rates of pneumoccocal XX

vaccination among at risk elderly patients.
Plan: Measure current care:
1. Sample Base Line Data Collection Measurement Strategy:
Target Population: All elderly patients who meet diagnostic
criteria
Sample: 100 percent time sample. Charts of all eligible patients
seen in the last three months.
Estimated sample size: XX charts
Data source: Billing data will be used to identify charts.
Plan: The team will meet in two weeks with results from the
base line data collection. They will decide on and fill out a
project time-line and task assignment work-sheet (see 1A),
collect base line data (see 1B) and calculate the practice rate of
vaccination (see 1C).
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Example of PDSA Application (continued)
1B. Collect Base Line Data
Charts will be pulled by a designated staff and will be audited for record of
vaccination.
Sample Base Line Data Collection Worksheet
(A)
(B)
(C)
Patient
Date of patient Examining
number
visit
physician

“When it
comes to
little things,
like ‘med
omissions’
that don’t
hurt
patients, no
one reports
or looks at
it.”
~ Physician

(D)
Vaccination recorded in chart
(yes/no)

1
2
3
4
5

1C. Calculate the Practice Rate of the vaccination
Vaccination table
Percent of Vaccinations =

#yes (column d)
X 100
#patients (column a)

2. Generate feedback reports and gap analyses
Feedback reports and gap analyses will be generated to show discrepancy between
current practice and optimal performance.
Sample Feedback Report and Gap Analysis:PCXX Vaccinations for Patients
Vaccinations completed
Completed/possible Percent success Gap analysis
Provider A (n=10) 9/10
90%
10%
improvement indicated
Provider B (n=15) 9/15
60%
40%
Provider C (n=5) 2/5
40%
60%
Provider D (n=10) 6/10
60%
40%
Provider E (n=10) 6/10
60%
40%
Total (n=50)
32/50
64%
36%
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3. Analyze Base Line Data
The vaccination team will organize a team meeting to analyze
the results from the base line data collection. It will assess the
difference in the rate of vaccination and compare features of
high success rate practice with those of lower levels of success
to identify reasons for the difference and the opportunities for
improvement.
3. Develop Improvement Plan

“We will
redesign
another 3
year strategic
plan this fall
and I hope to
see patient
safety become
some part of
that.”
~ CEO

The team will develop an improvement plan including the
following features:
a. Educate staff about the importance of PCXX vaccination
for at risk patients.
b. Implement the intervention process:

?
?
?
?

Front desk staff flags charts of at risk patients.
Nurse checks the chart for a record of the PCXX
vaccination.
If no vaccination is recorded, the nurse puts a sticky note
on the chart, reminding the physician to address the issue
of vaccination.
The physician records the vaccination or a note of
discussion with the patient in the chart.

3. Prepare a Presentation to Practice Leadership and Staff
After the team develops the improvement plan, the team will meet
with practice leadership, including the head physician and the QI
project manager, to gain "buy-in" by leadership. The presentation
will include:

?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

A discussion of a project goal;
Project time line;
Base line data collection results and analysis;
Opportunity statement;
Pilot improvement plan;
Pilot time line;
Resource expenditure statement (time/dollars);
Expected outcome.
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Case Studies
The case studies were developed over a four-year period and
reflect situations that have occurred in rural hospitals. They
provided a safe way for healthcare providers to collectively discuss
issues that develop in rural healthcare settings and design
strategies for responding to them.
The analysis model was developed in collaboration with the patient
safety team at Rush Medical College.
The cases are analyzed according to the following model:

“The cases
are very
interesting.
They like the
cases. Most
could happen
at any
institution.”
~ Nurse

?
?
?
?
?

Topic
Issue
Learning points
Clinical guides or standards
Room for improvement

In addition to the clinical issues that are depicted in each of the
following case studies, you may notice various ethical problems.
These problems might involve the traditional bioethics principles
such as beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and autonomy. The
cases might also raise other ethical considerations such as
impartiality or fairness, publicity or appropriate public disclosure,
contestability or ability of those involved to question decisions, or
processes for shared decisionmaking/collaboration. All of these
different considerations deserve discussion and reflection.
Twelve case studies are provided in this chapter. Additional case
studies can be found on the National Rural Bioethics Project
website: http://www.umt.edu/bioethics.
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Case Studies (continued)
Case Study 1:

The Case: Breast Milk Mix-up

“We've
changed our
perspective.
I run the
quality
program and
needed to
make it a
priority to
deal with
patient
issues.”
~ Quality
Control

Four newborns are being cared for in the small nursery at the local hospital due to a
variety of relatively minor problems including neonatal jaundice, difficulty
maintaining normal temperature, etc. Two of the mothers are breast feeding their
infants exclusively; since the mothers have been discharged, they are pumping and
storing breast milk for their infants. These packets of milk are labeled with the
infant's name and hospital identification information, and then placed in the
medication refrigerator.
Nurse Johnson, on the evening shift assigned to the nursery, retrieved one packet of
breast milk at 10 pm to feed Baby Jones. At 10:30, she went to the refrigerator to
retrieve breast milk for Baby Huebler. As she searched for a packet of breast milk
for Baby Huebler, she suddenly realized that she had initially intended to feed Baby
Huebler first but changed her plan because Baby Jones woke up and was crying.
She looked in the garbage can, found the packet of breast milk, and confirmed her
fear that she had given the wrong mother's breast milk to Baby Jones. “Well, this is
not ideal” she thought. “But at least it doesn't involve blood or something that really
matters.”

Questions:

?
?
?
?
?
?

Topic: what happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment plan correct?)
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment administered
properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
Ethical considerations (impartiality, publicity, contestability, shared
decisionmaking/collaboration)
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please specify)
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides could be
suggested to solve this problem and avoid future problems? (System
plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be considered?
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Summary
Topic:
 A baby in the hospital nursery received the wrong mother's breast milk.
This kind of situation is sometimes viewed as a "simple error," and one that
is not too worrisome. However, it has consequences that can prove
challenging for all involved.

“I think it is
helpful to
start
difficult
discussions
with words
like:‘in the
interest of
patient
safety, do
you think...’”
~ Quality
Control.

Issues:

 This case involves an accidental exposure to bodily fluids. It needs to
be approached similar to a needle stick. Most states have laws that allow
the person who suffered the accidental exposure to have the other person
tested for relevant body-fluid transmitted diseases (preferably with their
consent but most states allow testing even when consent is refused. Note:
this does not mean that testing is done without the person's knowledge, but
it can be done without their consent).
 The primary concern is transmission of HIV. Hepatitis C and B do not
appear to be transmitted via breast milk (see citations #1 & 2 below). In
the United States, approximately 7000 HIV-infected women give birth annually
(#3). The rate of HIV is increasing in rural areas. The Public Health
Service recommends that HIV infected women refrain from breast feeding due
to the risk of transmitting the virus via breast milk (#4).
Learning Points:










The hospital policy regarding accidental exposure to bodily fluids is
relevant.
The mother of the baby who received the wrong breast milk should be
informed of the error. The process of communication (what the parents are
told, how the information is relayed, and by whom) will be very important in
this case.
The mother whose breast milk was accidentally given to the wrong baby
should be informed of the error (without identifying the baby who received
the milk). This mother should also be told that she needs to be tested for
diseases that are transmitted via breast milk. (It might be adequate to
rule out the possibility of HIV infection via a history -- but that can be
extremely unreliable.)
Post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) is recommended for significant accidental
exposures to bodily fluids. The decision about when to offer PEP is usually
made based on the relative risk of infection. However, the earlier PEP is
started, the greater the chance of effectiveness. Hence, it is crucial to
rapidly identify the error and appropriate follow-up.
CQI team could be set up to take a look at the process and make
Chapter 6
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Case Studies (continued)

“We still
have some
caregivers
who give
defensive
documentation for
errors.”
~CEO

Standards & Guides:
 If the mother is found to be HIV positive, the parents and physician of the baby
who received the wrong breast milk will need to consider post exposure
prophylaxis (PEP). PEP should be initiated as quickly as possible. The usual
goal is to start within one to two hours after exposure. Hence, it is very
important to recognize this error and initiate appropriate steps.
 The risk of HIV in this scenario is very small. However, we are unable to
accurately predict who does or does not have the virus simply on their
'reputation'. In addition, the consequences for the infant are catastrophic if
infection does occur. PEP can significantly reduce the risk of infection.
 Treatments have consequences and so thorough patient education is required.
 In terms of patient safety, one option would be to treat breast milk similar to
blood -- eg, require two nurses to check packets against a baby's ID band at the
bedside. Other options, like a color coding system that links the mother's milk
and the baby could help prevent this error.
 The 5 rights of medication management (right patient, right dose, etc)
have relevance here.
 Review hospital policies for: (1) accidental exposure to bodily fluids to make
sure that breast milk is included as an example of a potential accidental
exposure. (2) billing since the lab work and possible treatment regimen have
financial repercussions; and (3) charting, disclosure, and other relevant
issues.
? Initiate appropriate training.

References:
1. Absence of infection in breast-fed infants born to hepatitis C virus-infected
mothers. Lin HH; Kao JH; Hsu HY; Ni YH; Chang MH; Huang SC; Hwang LH;
Chen PJ; Chen DS. J Pediatr 1995;126(4):589-91.
2. Evidence against breast-feeding as a mechanism for vertical transmission of
hepatitis B. Beasley RP; Stevens CE; Shiao IS; Meng HC. Lancet
1975;2(7938):740-1.
3. Prevalence and incidence of vertically acquired HIV infection in the United
States. Davis SF; Byers RH Jr; Lindegren ML; Caldwell MB; Karon JM; Gwinn M.
JAMA 1995;274(12):952-5.
4. Recommendations for assisting in the prevention of perinatal transmission of
human T-lymphotropic virus type III/ lymphadenopathy-associated virus and
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1985; 34:721.
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Case Studies (continued)
Case Study 2:
The Case: Osteomyelitis

“Like for
the foot
thing, what
can you say
to the
patient? Is
there a way
to say it?
Usually you
are so
aghast you
can't think
of a way to
deal with
it.”
~ Nurse

Brian, age 26, was diagnosed with juvenile onset diabetes at age 10. While working
on a construction job he stepped on a nail that went through his heavy work boots
and into the bottom of his foot. He sought medical care immediately. The wound
was thoroughly cleaned; he was admitted to the hospital and started on IV antibiotics
with an IV of D5NS at 100cc/hr. During the next three days, Brian's blood sugars
were elevated and erratic. The nurses suspected that he was sneaking candy bars
though Brian vigorously denied this. On the fourth day, Brian talked with his
physician about what was in the IV and asked that he be switched to a fluid without
any Dextrose in it. His IV was heplocked and his blood sugars returned to normal.
After a week in the hospital, Brian's wound looked healed although he complained
of increasing pain. He had Demerol 50-75mg IM ordered prn every 4-6 hours for
pain. His requests for Demerol had actually increased as the appearance of the
wound improved. The charge nurse, suspecting that he was drug seeking,
encouraged the physician to discharge him.
The physician respected the nurse's judgment and wrote an order to discharge Brian.
The next day Brian presented at the ER, complaining of increasing pain. An X-ray
of the lower leg, ankle, and foot showed an area of osteomyelitis. Brian went to
surgery later that day to clean and debride the area, and was re-admitted to the
surgical floor. He recovered quickly and required no pain medication after the first
post-op day.

Questions:
? Topic: what happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment plan correct?)
? Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment administered
properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
? Ethical considerations (impartiality, publicity, contestability, shared
decisionmaking/collaboration)
? Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please specify)
? Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides could be
suggested to solve this problem and avoid future problems? (System
plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
? Improvement: What steps for improvement should be considered?
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Case Studies (continued)
Summary

“You know
we are
dealing with
these things
and there
are no easy
fixes.
Every case I
read I just
had this 6
months ago
and 26 years
ago.”
~ CEO

Topic:
? 26 year-old with a foot puncture wound that becomes infected.
? Patient is a diabetic.
? Hospital course shows prolonged hospitalization with difficult
sugar management.
? Antibiotic treatment leads to apparent improvement in
infection (improving external appearance of foot).
? Patient develops pain that requires narcotics.
? Patient is diagnosed as drug seeking.
? Patient is discharged without identifying the cause of the pain
that is later found to be osteomyelitis.
? Diabetic patient with puncture wounds and increasing pain
despite appropriate antibiotic treatment.

Issues:
? Underlying current of distrust. Patient is thought to have eaten
candy bars as the cause of poor sugar control. Patient is
accused of drug seeking behavior.
? Providers are faced with conflicting information about cause
and effect. For example, the D5 IV complicates the
decision-making regarding sugar control. The "wound
improving" while the patient is complaining of more pain seem to
conflict.
? Patients with diabetes and wounds of the foot are especially at
risk for infection and at higher risk of osteomyelitis.
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Case Studies (continued)

“Overlooking
symptoms
based on a
chronic
patient is
very
possible.”
~ Physician

Learning Points:
?
Prevalence of osteomyelitis is high in diabetic patients with
puncture wounds. Approximately 1/3 of patients will develop
osteomyelitis. Therefore, a high index of suspicion is needed
and warranted.
?
Drug seeking behavior is over-diagnosed, especially if there is
no clear history of drug use.
?
Drug seeking behavior should not be considered when acute
injury is present.
?
The pain of osteomyelitis is severe and debilitating and pain
management must be adequate to control pain.
?
Increasing pain in patients with puncture wounds demands a
thorough search for osteomyelitis.
?
Two "red flag diagnosis situations" are present.
?
First, conflicting data leads to more diagnosis mistakes
(foot looks better, but pain worsens). For osteomyelitis,
this pairing of symptoms is common.
?
Second, if providers make the diagnosis of pain seeking
behavior, other diagnoses are more often missed.

Room For Improvement:
?
Routine surveillance for osteomyelitis in patients with puncture
wounds and diabetes should be considered.
?
If pain develops that requires narcotic, use later in the course of
illness; osteomyelitis is a common cause.
?
Distrust on the part of the provider or the patient leads to more
diagnosis mistakes.
?
The diagnosis of drug seeking behavior should be made with
extreme caution and only after making sure other causes of
pain are not being missed.
?
Conflicting information (one test positive; another negative) is
a clinical situation that leads to more diagnosis mistakes.
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Case Study 3:
The Case: Switching from IV to Oral Pain Medication

“We all talk
about it.
But getting
down to
data, really
knowing
what's going
on, that's
different.”
~ Physician

Mr. Darrow, a 78 year-old man, was admitted to the hospital due to
pain from metastatic prostate cancer. He was started on morphine
via a PCA pump achieving adequate pain management with 30 mg
MSO4 over 24 hours IV. Upon discharge, his physician ordered
that the PCA pump be discontinued and Mr. Darrow be started on
30 mg MSContin BID (twice daily) orally. Based on information
she had received at a continuing education seminar on pain
management, the nurse caring for Mr. Darrow believed this dose
would be inadequate. The speaker at the pain management
seminar emphasized that when switching patients from IV
morphine to oral morphine (MSContin), a 3:1 ratio should be used
for equianalgesia. Hence, the nurse believed that Mr. Darrow
should received 90 mg MSContin in 24 hours (45 mg BID).
The nurse approached the physician and shared the information she
obtained at the CNE course. The physician replied, “I've been
practicing medicine for 30 years. Sometimes a one-hour course
can make you think that you know everything about a subject.” He
then finished writing the discharge note, leaving his original order
intact. The nurse called the nursing supervisor to discuss her
concern but was told that since she had approached the physician
and the issue was not life-threatening, further actions were not
appropriate. During the discharge teaching with Mr. Darrow and
his wife, the nurse explained that they should call the doctor or
return to the hospital if the pain became intolerable. Thirty-six
hours later Mr. Darrow arrived at the ER and was subsequently
readmitted to the hospital for pain management.
Upon re-admittance, the physician switched to Duragesic patches,
a trans-dermal patch of Fentanyl. When the patient could not
tolerate this new medication, because of its side effects, he was
finally put back on MS Contin at an appropriate dose and did well.
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“When you
see a problem
it helps to
have
something to
point to for
back up.”
~ Pharmacist

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment plan
correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity, contestability,
shared decisionmaking/collaboration)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides could be
suggested to solve this problem and avoid future problems?
(System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

Summary
Topic:

Appropriate dosing when making conversions
Issues:

The nurse may consider the dosage, ordered by the physician,
as a mistake or an adverse event due to the training she
received, as well as to the quality of her interaction with the
physician. Both issues deserve some consideration. In the our
studies in rural healthcare settings, nurses and pharmacists
tended to be in agreement and view conversion issues, similar
to the one described in the case study, as “errors.” Physicians
were less likely to view such a situation as an error. While the
communication was not optimal, it is unclear if there is a link
between the patient’s re-admission and the discussion between
the nurse and the physician.

The nurse is correct in the conversion formula that she cited,
BUT so is the doctor. As suggested by Dr. Robert McNutt, one
of our collaborators, conversions are an evolving technology so
only logic defines the truth. The usual dose conversion from 30
IV to oral is 90 - as the nurse said. However, these are not hard
and fast rules. For example, there are several conversion
calculators on the web and they do not all give the same
conversions. In addition, many guidelines suggest reducing the
dose on discharge to avoid overdose in situations where the
patient may not be observed as closely as in the hospital.
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“Support is
key. The
person I
report to may
not think it's
a big deal
and may not
report it.”
~ Nurse

Substitution of medication is common and can be reasonable.
Side effects may change with substitution. Since these changes
have to be viewed as probabilistic, the dosage ordered by the
physician is not necessarily a systematic mistake or failure.
Members of the healthcare team may want to discuss the
decision to prescribe fentanyl. It is more expensive and not
necessarily more effective than morphine (though fentanyl is
preferred for patients requiring very high doses of opioids and
for people who can’t swallow). This patient did not seem to
meet those criteria. It may be preferable to have the patient on
an oral medication that can be more easily titrated, etc.

Learning Points:

It is unclear if the patient was informed of the change in
dosing; some patients will have more "side effects" if they
think they received something different than they thought they
were to receive. This situation could be considered a mistake if
there was no communication with the patient about the change
in medication, or if the change in medication increased, above
chance, the likelihood of side-effects and/or re-hospitalization.

Information about pain management in general and equianalgesic dosing in particular, is commonly taught to nurses in
either their basic education or at continuing education
seminars. Yet, prescribing pain medication is clearly outside
nurses' scope of practice. Both parties need to be clear about
their roles.

The patient may have suffered needless pain, an unnecessary
hospital admission, and an adverse reaction to the substitute
medication. Perhaps a more positive communication process
could have eliminated these outcomes.

The therapeutic window for pain medication is narrow. The
consequences of mistakes on the two ends are likely different.
On the low end, pain is the issue; on the high end, death is the
issue. This intuitively seems to suggest that some under-dose to
escalation is a reasonable construct. But, we don't know do we?
This is difficult. The rhetoric, however, should not sound like
"the patient being in pain is not as important to us". The
clinical issue is that pain management is an uncertain
environment of care. In such an environment, the use of
standards and criteria may reduce complications.
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“You get
into
semantics
and it's
hard. You
rationalize
things.
How much
arguing are
you going to
do?”
~ Nurse

Guides and Standards:

Consider using an Excel narcotic conversion chart like the one
developed by the patient safety team at Rush Medical College.

Consider the change to an oral dosage while the patient is still
hospitalized in order to monitor pain status.

The physician chose to err on the low side and titrate up; the
problem in this case was that there was no provision for
supplemental, quick acting, morphine. If that had been in place
then the patient may have been able to tolerate the pain until
the correct dose of MS Contin had been obtained and the levels
reach steady state.

MS Contin quite often has to be dosed at the q 8 h frequency to
maintain even analgesia.

On an organizational level, develop, implement, and reinforce
use of policies and procedures that encourage discussion of
patient care among team members.

Room for Improvement:

Consider use of Instant Reports so concerns can be logged and
evaluated for frequencies, patterns, and other issues.

Identify medical staff who can provide guidance and mediation
when such situations develop.

Employ effective communication strategies.
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Case Study 4:
The Case: Back Pain and Complications

“Analysis of
errors, other
than
medication, is
much more
difficult and
subjective”
~ Pharmacist

Mr. Bill Hedd is an 89-year-old man in relatively good health who
suffers from a common condition of the elderly, he's constipated.
However, this is more than your usual constipation; he goes almost a
week without a bowel movement, and because of remarkable
abdominal cramping, refuses to eat or drink much (though he tries
fiber and milk of magnesia). He has complained of intermittent
constipation for several years, but says that this is his “worst spell.”
Over the course of the week, he develops progressively worsening
weakness and fatigue. His pain gradually worsens - a dull constant
pain and occasional cramping pain, mostly in the lower abdomen, even
into the groin. He says that at times, it seems to come from his back.
He feels that might be associated with doing some housework earlier
in the week.
Because of the pain and misery, his daughter brings him to the
emergency department. He is told an X-ray of his abdomen and his
back appears normal; he is reassured that he is “just constipated” and
told to self-administer some enemas at home. The emergency
physician reassures him that, because the x-ray is normal, his back
pain is not recurrent prostate cancer.
He returns home, but has trouble administering the enemas. Instead,
he takes magnesium citrate, 6 ounces, and has a number of bowel
movements, feels much better, and eats a reasonable meal.
Approximately 24 hours later, he gets up from his recliner, collapses to
the floor, and calls 911 when he can't contact his daughters. He is
taken to the emergency department, given fluid resuscitation for
apparent dehydration, and then admitted because of recurrent,
persistent episodes of hypotension.
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“It's a
quandary.
What do you
do when you
don't think
it's right?”
~ Nurse

Mr. Hedd has a number of chronic, stable, medical conditions,
including:
1)
Hypertension, well controlled on an ACE-inhibitor (lisinopril,
10 mg).
2)
Hypercholesterolemia, well controlled on a “statin”
(simvistatin, 40mg).
3)
A remote history of a fall in the home felt to be associated with
a vascular event, probably a transient ischemic event with no
residual neurologic deficit.
4)
Prostate cancer, diagnosed 8 years ago and treated hormonally
(leuprolide) until 3 years ago. Recently, his PSA was noted to
be quite elevated at 154 ng/ml (normal<4 ng/ml). His internist
asked him to return to the urologist to consider resuming
treatment, but he refused. (The leuprolide gave him hot
flashes.);
5)
He had knee replacement surgery 4 years ago. He has never
had a heart attack, or chest pain.
Mr. Hedd lives independently at home; his daughter and son live
nearby and check on him daily. He is ambulatory, but has begun using
a cane. He still does all of his own grocery shopping, and drives
himself to the store. He does the crossword puzzle from New York
Times and the Washington Post each morning in less than an hour. He
has an evening cocktail, usually vodka and tonic. He smokes a pipe.
After his admission, he continues to have hypotensive episodes when
he tries to sit up, which he tries to do because it helps his continuing,
and worsening, back pain. The nurse has to make him lie supine, to
help regulate his blood pressure. He is given some Morphine
intravenously, 4 mg, for his pain. While it helps the pain, he has
further decline in his blood pressure. His regular physician sees him at
this time, and on further examination of his abdomen, he feels a large
pulsatile mass in the midline. The physician orders a CT scan of the
abdomen which confirms a large (9.5) cm dissecting abdominal aortic
aneurysm with evidence of blood leaking retroperitoneally into the left
iliopsoas muscle. The vascular surgeon suggests immediate operative
repair, while explaining how dangerous it will be. Mr. Hedd agrees to
have the surgery, saying, “What else could I do; I don't want to die!”
The surgeon tells the internist that he wishes Mr. Hedd would “just say
no.”
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“Rural
hospitals are
held to the
same
standard of
diagnosis as
urban
centers.”
~ Physician

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

Summary
Topic:
 Elderly patient with chronic conditions including constipation,
back pain, and prostate cancer reports to the ER complaining of
increased severity of symptoms.
Issues:
 The patient's history of constipation sets a tone for his care. Is
it reasonable to assume, given no signs of impending collapse,
that this is just another case of constipation?
 This case is rife with uncertainty. The aortic abdominal
aneurysm (AAA) may just be a random intervening event or
could have been accentuated by the bearing down and the
medication use. Was it there in the ER? We do not know.
 Patients with chronic disease and chronic problems present a
special and difficult aspect of diagnosis mistakes. Among all
the professions who read this case, some saw a preventable
mistake, others did not. The ER doctors may have found the
AAA if they did an ultrasound of the abdomen, but should an
ultrasound be done in patients with chronic constipation on
each visit? What is a reasonable standard?
 Can we reasonably find a way to improve the situation,
ultrasound in all patients with abdominal complaints as a
standard, for example? If not, can there be a mistake or error?
 The hottest decision point was made when the care givers
accepted the fact that the patient was primarily constipated if
not impacted following a week of no bowel activity.
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Learning Points:

“There are
myriad
clinical
decision
points along
any
diagnostic
tree. Retracing the
decisions are
often
difficult.”
~ Physician

 Delays and misdiagnoses likely increase in chronic
conditions where some intervening illness presents in a
similar fashion to the chronic illness presentation.
 An important clue was that the patient's condition had
worsened and maybe this should have triggered a closer
more in-depth examination that may have indicated a
differential diagnosis.
 Expectations for diagnosis certainty should be lowered in
complex, competing disease states (constipation, back pain,
prostate cancer).
Clinical Guides or Standards:

 Flat plates of the abdomen are not useful for AAA or
masses. The use of ultrasound for cases with complex
clinical situations that may mask serious disease might be
considered.
Room For Improvement:

 Perhaps elderly patients with abdominal complaints should
be considered for ultrasound to rule out aortic abdominal
aneurysm as the standard of care. This, however, would
require training, technical capabilities, and money. These
potential constraints make this sort of implementation less
likely to be accomplished.
 When critical lesions are found, then early transfer may be
an option.
 It may have been wise to provide an enema under clinical
directions, and then re-examine.
 Is this an area where a second opinion would have been
warranted?

Case Study 5:
The Case: Switching to Fentanyl patches from oral pain meds
Mr. Jacobs, a long-time rancher, was treated for head and neck
cancer for several years. Given the advanced status of his disease,
further treatment was aimed at making him comfortable. Since
there were no hospice services available in his remote community,
Mr. Jacobs received care from his family practice physician.
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His family regularly drove Mr. Jacobs to the physician's office in a
small town about 90 minutes away from his home. Mr. Jacob was
on MS Contin 45 mg BID orally for six months with good pain
management. However, the growing tumors created problems with
swallowing and so his physician wrote a new order for Duragesic
50 mcg patches (transdermal fentanyl). The rural hospital
pharmacist told Mr. Jacob how to apply and dispose of the patches,
and also helped him put on the first one.

“It really
comes down
to if this was
your mother
and you had
to make sure
she got the
right pills,
what would
you do?”
~ Pharmacist

Beyond the pharmacist's assistance, Mr. Jacob did not receive any
additional instructions in terms of pain management. At home
later that evening, he experienced a huge spike in pain.
Throughout the night, he was unable to sleep and vomited
repeatedly. The following morning Mr. Jacob, fearing that his
dying process would be marked by intractable pain, used his
hunting rifle to kill himself.

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

Summary
Topic:

?
?

Changing narcotic medications.
Conversion may lead to adverse events.
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Issues:

?
?
?
?

“There is
always some
balancing
how much is
it worth to
deal with
it?”
~ Nurse

For cancer patients, suicide rates are greatest for those
suffering from head and neck cancer.
There is no "gold standard" for converting from one
narcotic to another. (The literature reports up to a 3X
variation when converting from some narcotics to others).
There are no decision support programs available for wide
use that check for incompatibility for doses of narcotics.
The timing of the change from oral MS (45mg) to the patch
may be important in this case. Was this gentleman on oral
MS at the time the patch was placed or was the patient
without narcotics before changing to the patch? This is
important for the following reasons:

Learning Points:
?
A special problem may arise when converting from oral or
IV narcotics to a patch. Even if the dose conversion is
correct (as this case), there is a lag time to stable pain
control with the patch.
?
When changing to a patch, some other narcotic needs to be
prescribed for breakthrough pain.
Room For Improvement:
?
When using a patch, provide additional pain medication,
oral, sub-q or IV, to supplement pain control until the patch
has time to work.
?
The pharmacist who filled the order should have informed
the patient of the titration period, sometimes as long as 2-3
days.
?
Be aware of the potential for suicide in all patients with
cancer and especially with head and neck cancer.
?
In addition to education, consider regulations to have
pharmacists check for appropriate conversion when
changes are made in narcotic orders.
?
When using patches for pain, warn patients about the
potential for breakthrough pain and provide medication for
exacerbation.
?
The patient should have been given information about
where to turn and ask for help if the pain exacerbated.
?
A national agenda should be undertaken to establish a
universal guideline for use of narcotics with special
emphasis on appropriate conversion.
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Case Study 6:
The Case: Did I Do The Right Thing?

“It didn't
happen here
yet, but it
could and
maybe it will
tomorrow”
~ Nurse

Hilda Hensen has worked as director of nursing in a rural hospital
for nearly fifteen years. This is a hospital, she explains, in which
patients expect to be treated “as though they were family
members.” That expectation is not surprising since community
members built the hospital, laid the floor boards, and painted the
walls. “This is not a world,” she explains during an interview,
“where we can turn people away like they do in the big city
hospitals. This is a world where people are tight and everybody is
a little bit of kin.” This is a world of connections; there are few
secrets on Main Street.
When describing her community, Hilda offered comments such as
“everybody knows everybody” and “people value their own.”
Still, she noted, “a hospital can feel like a strange place. People
may not know what decisions they will have to make. She
explained that recently a very young, first time mother recently
experienced a long and difficult labor. Throughout the labor and
birth, the young woman cried and begged the nurses for pain
medication. Pain medication was certainly available, but the
woman's husband told the nurses that the Bible explicitly stated:
“In pain shall you deliver your young.” He stayed at his wife's
side throughout the labor and delivery and repeatedly insisted that
she must not be given any pain relief. The family's minister also
stayed in the room with the young couple. Hilda said she and the
other staff who were working that night accepted the husband's
wishes and coached the young woman as best they could. It was a
long and stressful night; the young woman had a very difficult
time.
The nurses were irritated with the husband and the minister, but
they did not discuss the situation among themselves or with the
couple. Hilda believed that life would be “easier for the woman in
the long run” if they obeyed her husband. In fact, she thought she
was doing the young woman a favor. Hilda was familiar with their
Church and she knew the minister. The minister and the husband
would have been angry if pain medication had been given. “There
are so few secrets in this town” explained Hilda. If the woman had
accepted pain medication, she would have been seriously criticized
by her family and members of the congregation. She would have
been shunned.
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The young mother expressed gratitude to the nurses when she was
discharged from the hospital. She was glad she had not received pain
medication and told the nurses they could be “trusted” because their
actions had not placed her or her family in jeopardy. At the end of
the interview Hilda asked: “Would you call that an ethical issue? A
mistake? Did I do the right thing?”

“Over time
we become
too
complacent
and assume
far too
much.”
~ CEO

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment plan
correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity, contestability,
shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

Case Study 7:
The Case: Morphine and Renal Failure
Mrs. Thomas, 52 years old, was recently diagnosed with gastric
cancer. She has had a long history of diabetes and has been on
hemodialysis for two years because of renal failure. Due to an
increasing dull, aching, abdominal pain her oncologist prescribed
15mg MS Contin BID, a very low dose. Two days later, her adult
daughter brought her to the emergency room because Mrs. Thomas
was extremely lethargic. In the ER, Mrs. Thomas was difficult to
arouse with pinpoint pupils. Mrs. Thomas was admitted to the ICU for
airway protection and was given Narcan IV and fluids (necessitating
an additional dialysis). She recovered within a few days and was
switched to Oxycontin (with Oxycodone for breakthrough pain),
which she tolerated without problems.
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“We simply
have to
believe our
systems are
far better
than this in
the simple
act of caring
for one
another.
Surprise! We
are not.”
~ CEO

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?
Summary
Topic:

?

Narcotic dose adjustment in renal failure.

Issues:

?

15MG MS contin is a low dose. It is equivalent to 10MG of
morphine in a 24 hour time period. This would be equal to
about 2MG of dilaudi d. These are small starting doses.
Clearance is partially via the kidneys. The dose reduction is
50% if the GFR is <10.

?

Adverse Event involving apparent overdose of narcotic.

Learning Points:

?

All opioids can cause problems in renal failure - including
Oxycodone, the drug given to this patient. In fact, acute
renal failure has been described with Oxycodone
suppositories. "Conservative" doses are recommended
even for this drug (Micromedex). Some trials show that
Methadone works better than MS.

?

15 mg bid is a low dose; but 50% reduction would be
reasonable.

?

For most patients, the consequences of an overdose are
worse than the consequences of an under-dose (pain in one
case; potential death in the other) so many doctors try lower
first and build.
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Room For Improvement:

“We struggle,
day in and
day out, with
orders like
“meds as at
home.”
~ Pharmacist

?

It is important to consider that dosing errors can occur at
home as well as in the hospital. Some education or
communication at discharge about how to give narcotics at
home may help. An assessment of the family's ability to
handle adversity and an assessment of the family's
emotional state may help as some can not deal with pain
and suffering. It may be helpful to have national discharge
planning instructions for all patients taking narcotics at
home following hospital discharge. Case discussions
should include as much detail as possible before assigning
cause and effect. Often there are extenuating
circumstances.

?

Interviews with providers at the bedside often change the
discussions and the assignment of cause and effect.

Case Study 8:
The Case: Mrs. Smith Goes to the Doctor
Mrs. Smith, a 56-year old patient, has been diagnosed with a
number of health problems. Her diagnoses include: hypertension,
increased lipids, diabetes mellitus II, asthma, osteo-artritis,
diverticulosis, ERT, COPD, CAD, sigmoidal resection, and chronic
pain. During a recent visit, she told her physician that she was
tired and had recently experienced some dizzy spells. The doctor
ordered a work up that could rule out a cerebrovascular accident
(CVA). Mrs. Smith's current medications include: Ipratropium (1
ampule in neblizer), Albuterol (2 puffs, q.i.d), Combivent MDI (2
puffs every 4 hours prn), Advair Diskus 500/50 (1 puff b.i.d),
Centrum MVI (1 daily), Vitamin E 400 IU (1 daily), Citracal-D (1
po t.i.d.), Premarin 0.625mg (1 po daily), Docusate 100 mg (1 po
b.i.d), Quinine 325 mg (1 po daily at bedtime), Aciphex 20 mg (1
po daily), Simvastatin 20 mg (1 po daily at bedtime), Lisinopril 40
mg (1 po daily), Glipizide XL 10 mg (2 po daily), Vioxx (20 mg
daily), Albuterol unit dose nebulizer (q.i.d.), and baby aspirin.
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“I could say
we don't do
as deep an
investigation
as needed.
We don't get
to the root.
But not
intentionally.
It's just the
way we do
it.”
~ Pharmacist

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

Summary
Topic:

?
?

Poly pharmacy
Syncope/weakness in patients with multiple medications.

Issues:

?

Elderly patients with multiple medications who develop
side effects while on those medications should be tested for
cause-effect of drug side-effects by drug withdrawal trials.

?

The most likely agent causing symptoms should be stopped
first. An example, a dig withdrawal trial found that about
40% could stop the medication (did not get more short of
breath), but 60% worsened with stopping the medication.

?

Try as we might, however, there is no science to assess the
best practice for polypharmacy.

?

Recent articles even suggest that a "polypill" with 6 agents
for cardiovascular health should be considered. However,
rebuttals remind that there are no trials that test the best
"number of pills".

?

Obvious duplication should be avoided.
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Learning Points:

“They are in
a rush and
people get in
trouble.
They don't
re-check
anymore.
They don't
do 1,2,3,4,5.
They do
1,4,5. ”
~ Quality
Control

?
?

No high quality data exists on what is "polypharmacy".

?

Excess consultation is a predictor of polypharmacy, but this
is confounded with indication and the need to consult.

?

Hospitalization is a predictor of new medications and
reconcilliation when in the out-patient setting is a must.

?

Polypharmacy is presently an unsolvable conundrum and
uncertainty is certain. Each case must, at present, be
individualized and trial and error is the norm for evaluation.

No national databases exist that are of high enough quality
to assess the true consequences of polypharmacy.

Room for Improvement:

?

Only patient specific withdrawal trials should be done
(when possible).

?
?

Reconcile all medication lists with primary care providers.

?

MORE communication, not less is needed between
providers.

?

Evaluate the decision to give medications in uncertain or
low benefit situations; time and close follow-up are often
better plans.

?

NSAIDs can be dangerous in the elderly, and for patients
with CHF, CRF, PUD, DM and hypertension.

Include the patient in evaluating the risk and benefits of
medications. Often patients know what is best (but the
placebo effect is huge).
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Case Study 9:
The Case: Needle Stick

“Any issues
brought to
light should
be seen as
helpful and
that
environment
needs to be
developed.
When that is
developed,
employees
come
forward. It's
one step at a
time and we
deal with it.”
~ Nurse

In order to cover staff summer vacations, the lab supervisor is
helping with morning lab draws. She will do this for about two
weeks. The supervisor does not normally do routine lab draws for
hospitalized patients and the location of the sharps disposal box
has changed since her earlier practice. She develops a routine for
blood draws where she stands at the patient's bedside while
drawing the blood, placing the used sharps on the sink (which is
within reach). Once she has completed her work with the patient,
she disposes the needles in the sharps box (which is not within
reach from the bedside).
On her third morning, she draws blood from a patient who has
been admitted with liver failure; she places the used syringe on the
sink, but neglects to place it in the “sharps box” before leaving.
Approximately 10 minutes later, the night shift RN, finishing her
care for this patient, comes into the room. In the process of caring
for him, she backs into the syringe. The needle sticks into her
buttocks and the plunger is briefly pressed against the back of the
sink area. The nurse leaves the room very upset and in tears. After
asking colleagues if they had seen anyone enter the patient's room
in the last hour, she realizes that the syringe was left by the lab
supervisor.
She calls her nurse manager to report the whole incident. The
nurse manager tells her to complete an incident report and be
examined in the ER when she completes her shift (in
approximately 20 minutes). She also tells the nurse to not talk
with the lab supervisor directly, but to allow someone in
administration to do so if they think it is warranted saying, "There
is no point in making her feel badly about this."
However there is a delay of about 2 hours because of staffing and
her emotional distress. She is also embarrassed to be seen in the
ER because she is overweight and dreads having her colleagues
examine the needle stick site.
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Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

“The RN
employee's
health should
be the first
priority”
~ Physician

Summary
Topic:

?

Accidental needle stick that fits the criteria for an adverse
event. This is a 'significant' exposure in the occupational
health language because the hub of the needle probably had
blood in it and the needle stick resulted wasn't just a prick
because the plunger was depressed -- potentially injecting
an unknown amount of blood into the nurse.

Issues:

?

The patient's diagnosis is troubling -- liver failure could be
secondary to hepatitis. And HIV is an issue since some of
the risky behaviors that result in hepatitis also are
associated with HIV.

?

Failure to use, or have access to, appropriate disposal are
serious mistakes.

?

Inadequate back-up for critical procedures or people (This
adverse event would have been less likely with an expert
lab draw).

?

The delay of seeking prompt treatment is a serious
problem.
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Learning Points:

“The goal is
to prevent a
similar
occurrence in
the future”
~ Physician

?

The RN employee's health should be the first priority and
an immediate trip to the E.D using the full protocol should
be employed.

?

The nurse manager should have relieved the nurse from
duty and arranged for medical attention. If the injured
nurse refuses to seek medical attention, such a refusal
should be well documented.

?

Although difficult to design, given short supply, pressures,
etc., a back-up system for all critical procedures/people is
essential.

?

While not uncommon, the person who left the syringe
needs to be told immediately and compassionately about
the error so that the unsafe practice(s) can be adjusted
promptly. If prompt action is not taken, the potential for
further errors increases, not to mention the potential for
gossip.

?

The organization needs to maintain the employee's
confidentiality re: the needle-stick, treatment, or outcome.

Guides:

?

An OSHA hazard assessment needs to be performed in all
areas where such procedures are being performed. The
assessment should be documented and a copy included in
response to the incident report as well as the corrective
action taken.

?
?

The nurse may well be a candidate for prophylaxis.
Our medical consultants suggest that treatment can be
complicated. They suggest using the CDC website for
explicit direction s. The address is: http://www.cdc.gov
guides for needle-stic k. When you access that site, go to
health topics A-Z and choose Needle stic k. That page also
links to a new UCLA site on needle stick s. Both are
excellent sources.
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Areas For Improvement:

“I sat with a
kid like this
for more
sleepless
nights at the
hospital than
I have been
able to
forget.”
~ Nurse

?

Consider using only experts for toughest and most
dangerous lab draw.

?

Consider a fail-safe system for needle with technology for
immediate needle disposal.

?

Consider training all about - draw -discard- draw -discard reminders all over the hospital. The need to take immediate
action needs to be stressed.

?

As the situation is investigated thoroughly, areas for
improvement may be identified on an organizational wide
basis. This review may reveal
that there are policy, practice, training issues that are
broader than for specific employees.

Case Study 10:
The Case: Teen with Asthma
Katy Adams is a 15-year-old girl who has had severe asthma since
age 3. She is 60 inches tall and weighs 92 pounds. She has been
hospitalized numerous times in the rural town where she lives.
Hospitalizations are triggered by either respiratory infections or
environmental allergens. Katy has traditionally been very
responsible and compliant but the teenage years have been
challenging; on numerous occasions, she has tried to downplay
symptoms and delay treatment.
At 11:00 pm, Katy is brought to the ER by her father. At that time,
she admits that she has not been tracking her peak expiratory flow
rates at home, has been wheezing more than normal, and has been
exposed to more allergens than normal because of an air inversion.
Katy's peak expiratory flow rate on evaluation in the ER is 53% of
predicted, given her height; O2 saturation by oximetry is 89%,
respiratory rate is 48 and labored and heart rate is 145. Initial
treatment in the ER included low flow oxygen via nasal cannula,
Albuterol via nebulizer (a beta-2-selective adrenergic agonists),
and Atrovent via nebulizer (an anticholinergic agent). Within 30
minutes, Katy's wheezes are significantly improved, RR=36,
breathing is less labored and O2 sat is 92%.
The ER physician decides to admit Katy and at 1:15 AM, Katy is
taken upstairs to the medical floor with orders for vitals q. 1 hour
until stable and to start systemic corticosteriods in addition to O2,
Albuterol and Atrovent. Katy receives the first dose of
corticosteriods at 3:30 AM.
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“Our attitude
and egos get
in the way of
data-based
medicine and
we treat
what we
know, not
always what
we see before
us.”
~ CEO

At 7 AM the day shift nurse receives the report from the night shift
nurse. The night nurse reports that Katy appears to be somewhat
improved and watched TV, while sitting up in bed, instead of
sleeping. The nurse also reports that Katy has had diffuse
expiratory wheezes throughout her lungs during the night but that
in the past hour the wheezes can no longer be heard. Katy's vital
signs also seemed improved. Heart rate had been 130 most of the
night and now is 115. Respiratory rate had been 30-40 most of the
night and now is 26. The use of accessory muscles for breathing
seems to be reduced. The nurse did not check an O2 sat with the
last vitals as the oximeter was being used by another nurse, but O2
sats have ranged from 90-94% throughout the night on oxygen.
After listening to the report, the day shift nurse asks the night nurse
what position Katy was in the last time the nurse was in the room.
The night nurse reports that when she checked on Katy
approximately 10 minutes earlier, she was sitting upright in the
middle of her bed, cross-legged, leaning on her arms watching TV.
The day shift nurse rushed to Katy's room immediately where she
found Katy in a classic 'tripod' position. Katy could not talk due to
shortness of breath; no wheezes were heard because essentially no
air was moving in her lungs. Oximetry showed a SAO2 of 80 %.
The nurse called a code and Katy was taken immediately to the
ICU where she was successfully intubated. After 3 days, Katy was
discharged to home with a tapering schedule of oral corticosteriods
to reduce the risk of relapse and readmission.

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?
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Topic:

?

Management of Severe Asthma Exacerbation.

Issues:

“I shared this
case with a
few staff
members and
they stated
that this very
kind of case
had happened
to them and
in fact it was
because no
one checked
the oxygen
level and it
was a
teenager.”
~ Nurse

?
?
?

Potential mismatch of goal and treatment due to not giving
steroids early in care.
Potential mismatch of goal to accurately assess the
progress of patient while on therapy.
Case has cues that suggest the patient was improving and it
is unclear if the patient suddenly takes a turn for the worse,
or if subtle cues were being missed.

Learning Points:
?
Cochrane review of use of steroids found that patients with
moderate to severe asthma exacerbation had a reduced
readmission rate if steroids given.

Guides:
?
No reliable data exist for prediction of response to therapy.
?
Respiratory rate, peak flow, 02 saturation, use of accessory
muscles of respiration, pulse, and airway sounds are all
used in follow-up.
?
The lack of a single best method or predictor of response to
therapy makes this a moving target. In addition, no specific
data exist to suggest the best triage decision (ED, floor, or
ICU). This lack of evidence leads to variation in judgments
by providers.
Room for Improvement:
?
Patients with asthma are so common that providers can
forget to gauge the level of severity of the exacerbation.
?
Guidelines can help providers judge the severity of illness.
?
For Katy, the peak flow and 02 findings defined a severe
exacerbation.
?
A standard protocol for asthma should include a judgment
of severity and appropriate plan of treatment.
?
A standard protocol could be established for monitoring
patients.
?
A worsening peak flow or failure to improve the 02
saturation would prompt providers to consider ICU care.
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Case Study 11:
The Case: Surgery, Slow Recovery, and a Fall
After receiving a total knee replacement, an 83 year old man is put
on coumadin. Two days after surgery he is noted to have a
delirium. Its cause is presumed to be post-op and may be
secondary to pain medications. The notes of several nurses reveal
that he seems worse after getting vicodin. He begins to clear over
the following week, but occasional notes in his chart reveal that he
is oriented X2; once X3. His neurology exam is normal.

“They weren't
looking at the
PATIENT,
they were
only
following a
protocol.”
~ Quality
Control

Since he shows only slow improvement, he is discharged and
admitted the same day to a rehab hospital floor. Two days after
this admission, he falls and bumps his head. His INR is 1.5-1.9. A
consulting neurologist notes that he has no LOC, or head ache and
his physical exam is normal. The patient is followed daily and
monitored closely by multiple providers; all say he is oriented to
time, person, and place and no focal neurological deficits are
noted. Several notes say: "no need for a CT scan as his exam
remains normal".
Despite a slow recovery with rehab, his family does not think he is
as sharp as before and want him to go home to normal
surroundings for a time. The PT/OT staff report that he needs 24hour/day watch for falling and he is discharged. Three days after
his return home he is noted to be "dull and weak." He is taken to
an ED and they find a large subdural hematoma with herniation.
The patient dies.
Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?
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Topic:

?

Elderly patients on anticoagulants (heparin, LMWH,
coumadin, ASA, platelet inhibitors) who fall and hit their
head.

Issue:

?
“I think
sometimes we
as nurses
don’t explore
all venues
when we
think we are
faced with a
patient who
has a
‘complaining
nature.’”
~ Nurse’

CT scans versus clinical observation for intracranial
bleeding.

Learning Points:
?
Nausea, vomiting, severe head ache, LOC, seizures, signs
of trauma above the clavicle, and age > 60 are predictors of
increase risk. If any of the above is positive (in this case age >60 and sign of trauma on the head), the risk of
intracranial bleeding is nearly 1/10.
?
The clinical examination is less reliable when the patient
has baseline neurologic compromise.
Guide:

?
?
?

CT scan is the most reliable test for determining if a patient
on anticoagulation who falls has intracranial bleeding and
should be considered unless a contraindication exists.
It is not clear when is the best time to order the CT.
If a CT scan cannot be done, the physician may consider
stopping anticoagulation if the benefit is less than the risk.

Room for Improvement:
?
Patient education including informing patients of the
difficult trade-offs for this clinical situation.

Case Study 12:
The Case: Post-Op Nausea
A 32 year old woman with a history of significant post-operative
nausea and has developed allergies to a number of medications
used for such nausea.
Cynthia, age 32, is admitted for abdominal surgery to relieve a
bowel obstruction due to peritoneal attachments. She has had
multiple abdominal surgeries to correct congenital problems, but
has a history of significant post-operative nausea.
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She has become fearful of not having her post-operative pain
aggressively managed. Unfortunately, she has also developed
allergies/negative reactions to many medications including
Compazine (prochlorperazine), Vistaril (hydroxyzine), and Reglan
(metoclopramide).

“If nursing is
worried about
over-sedation
they need to
talk with the
MD about it
and plan
ahead.”
~ Nurse

Her abdominal surgery was uneventful and an epidural line was
placed for post-operative pain management. A naso-gastric tube
was also placed. The physician ordered a Fentanyl (droperidol)
drip through the epidural line on a maintenance dose (with orders
allowing the nurses to increase this maintenance level if needed).
In addition, Cynthia could use the patient-controlled bolus feature
on the epidural pump to administer a small bolus for break-through
pain. In addition, the nurses had orders allowing them to
administer a larger bolus for uncontrolled pain. Finally, Cynthia
also has orders for treatment of nausea including Phenergan
(promethazine) 25 mg IV q. 4-6 hours as needed and Zofran
(ondansetron) 8 mg IV q. 8-12 hours as needed.
The first 24 hours after surgery were miserable for Cynthia. Her
pain was only marginally managed. The nurses would provide a
bolus of Fentanyl via the epidural line when Cynthia's pain became
intolerable, but within minutes she would experience severe nausea
and would begin gagging. This caused NG tube movement that
further stimulated her gag reflex, and led to non-productive
vomiting and increased abdominal pain. The nurses would then
give her a bolus of Phenergan IV.
The combination of pain and nausea medication would cause her to
become very drowsy and difficult to arouse. Every hour or two the
whole cycle would be repeated. The nurses were reluctant to
increase her Fentanyl drip fearing that she would become oversedated. Cynthia said she was sure the doctor had promised
medication for the nausea, but the nurses maintained that they
should not provide additional medication because it would further
sedate her. Both times the surgeon made rounds, Cynthia was
asleep so he checked with the nurses on her condition. They
reported that Cynthia was very difficult to manage due to the
sedation and her complaining nature.

Chapter 6
Page 74

Patient Safety in Rural Settings
Case Studies (continued)

“When it
comes to
little things,
like ‘med
omissions’
that don’t
hurt
patients, no
one reports
or looks at
it.”
~ Physician

Questions:
?
Topic: What happened? (Diagnosis/prognosis/treatment
plan correct?)
?
Issues: What issues need to be addressed? (Treatment
administered properly? Appropriate clinical procedures?)
?
Ethical considerations: (Impartiality, publicity,
contestability, shared decisionmaking/collaboration?)
?
Learning Points: What are the learning points? (Please
specify)
?
Standards & Guides: What clinical and/or nursing guides
could be suggested to solve this problem and avoid future
problems? (System plan? System solution? Disclosure?)
?
Improvement: What steps for improvement should be
considered?

Summary
Topic:
?
Inadequately managed pain and post-op nausea
?
Treating post-op nausea

Main Issues:
?
Inadequate pain management
?
Inadequate nausea management
?
Communication
Learning Points:
?
Intervention for pain management only occurred when pain
"became intolerable." Need to address pain issues before
pain becomes intolerable.
?
Should have increased the maintenance dose as needed.
?
Droperidol, the generic name for Inapsine, may not be an
optimal choice for an epidural drip. Zofran was not given at
all.
?
Inadequate communication with the anesthesia provider or
the physician. Using labels like patient has a "complaining
nature" creates barriers.
?
If nursing is worried about over-sedation they need to talk
with MD about it and plan ahead.
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“I want
to stay
here until
I retire. I
choose my
battles. I
wonder if
that’s
fair ?”
~Nurse

Guides:
?
Treatment could include premedicating for nausea prior to
giving a bolus.
?
Some medications, if used in a smaller dosage and given
prior to pain medication could minimize the nausea.
?
A sedation score sheet might have been helpful in
medication administration. There are several available;
Cook and Palma Sedation Scale, Mccaffery and Pasero's
Sedation scale, Nisbet and Norris Sedation scale, Modified
Sedation Score in Children Barker and Nisbet, Sedation
Score of Mackenzie and Grant, Ramsey Sedation Score. If
anyone is interested in these they can be found at this web
site. Www.medal.org/ch32.html.
?
A substitution for fentanyl in the drip may have been tried
as well.
Room For Improvement:
?
Consideration of ICU placement for closer observation or
at least have Narcan available.
?
Conference between the patient, nurses, and MD would
have helped.
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N
“In our
hospital we
are looking
at a
physician
relation
program
and trying
to make
sure we
aren’t part
of the
problem.”
~ Quality
Control.

o one solution will necessarily make healthcare safer.
Depending on the situation, context, and individual
learning styles, any number of resources may be useful.
The tools in the following section are included as guides to help
rural healthcare institutions increase communication and dialogue
across professions; they are also intended to help identifying and
reaching common goals.
The tools in this section include:
?
System Quadrant Analysis Tool
?
Organizational Decision-making Tool
?
Chart Form For Patient Care (2 Pages)
?
Ethical Decision-making Map
?
Readers Theater Script
Tool 1: Quadrant for System Analysis
This tool was developed to help healthcare providers analyze a
problematic situation.
Tool 2: Organizational Decision-making Process
At times when we make decisions it is helpful to come to
agreement and achieve realistic expectations. This tool will help
healthcare providers work toward common goals as an
organization.
Tool 3: Chart-Form (2 Pages)
This form is designed to help patients and family members discuss
diagnosis and treatment options with members of the healthcare
team.
Tool 4: Ethical Decision-making Map
This tool helps healthcare providers identify areas of conflict,
parties involved, and concerns of those involved. It also helps
identify potential ethical issues that need attention.
Tool 5: Readers Theater
Readers Theater offers healthcare providers a way to view their
beliefs and behaviors in a different light. The script draws on the
quantitative and qualitative data from our rural studies.
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System Error Analysis

“I know that
new orders
are not being
reviewed
every day.”
~ Pharmacist

1.

Facts & Assumptions
a. Is diagnosis correct?
b. Is prognosis correct?
c. Is treatment plan correct?
d. Is your information
adequate?
e. Incorrect assumptions?

3.

Attitudes & Biases
4.
a. Is this patient being
labeled?
b. Do you ‘like’ this patient as
a person?
c. How would you want to be
treated in similar
situations?
d. Are there other ways to
view the issue?

2.

Actions & Process Issues
a. Was the treatment
administered properly?
b. Was documentation done
correctly?
c. Was procedure followed?
d. Were there other options?

System & Safety issues
a. What are the
organizational issues?
b. Does the system have an
existing plan to cover these
problems?
c. Was it followed?
d. Could there be systems
solution?
e. How do the Threads help
us understand the problem?
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Clarify the Organizational Standard

?
?
?

Gold rule: the best healthcare for the greatest numbers of people;
Silver rule: doing more than avoiding harm but not fully committed to the best
healthcare for the greatest number of people;
Tin rule: pursuit of good without violating the rights of stakeholders.

Initiate a Process for Making Ethical Decisions

“We stress
non-punitive
but it will
take some
time before
the person
making the
error feels
that they are
not at fault.”
~ Quality
Control

?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Identify all parties involved in decision;
Level the playing field to minimize disparities in power knowledge and other areas
of the varies parties;
Help parties define interests;
Search for common ground and areas of consensus;
Identify options for consideration;
Evaluate the decision;
Document the decision.

Examine Areas of Potential Harm

?
?
?
?
?

Clarify harms to affected parties and seek the lesser harm;
Weigh the potential harms, the consequences in terms of seriousness & quantity;
Clarify the commonly accepted rules and norms for the culture/community; this
includes consideration of organizational, professional and cultural norms;
Determine mitigating circumstances, chiefly, the capacity to act with knowledge
and freedom;
Develop strategies to minimize harm to those who may be harmed.

Develop Criteria for Outcome

?
?
?
?
?

Seek the best that can be done;
Clarify the minimal criteria for organizational ethics (standard you won’t go
below);
Disseminate the accepted rules;
Act with consistency;
Seek ways to compensate the vulnerable and disadvantaged.
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GUIDE FOR PATIENT AND FAMILY DECISION-MAKING
This form is designed to help
patients and family members
discuss medical indications and
treatment options with members of
the healthcare team. A signed copy
of this form should be given to the
patient or family member(s) and
should also be included in the
patient’s chart.
SECTION

“If it is going
to make a
difference, I
will take
action.”
~ Nurse

Last Name of Patient

First Name/Middle Initial of Patient

Patient Date of Birth ( mm/dd/yy)

What is the patient’s diagnosis?

What interventions are recommended?

Areas discussed with
patient/family:
 pt/family understand diagnosis
 pt/family understand treatment
 pt/family understand choices
 consequences of
accepting/refusing therapy
 concerns about coercion,
duress, abandonment,
or
capacity

 advance directives/DNR
 financial issues
 life expectancy
 potential disability/suffering
 interpreter needed
 pt/family advised about who to ask for
information (see other side)

Who agrees with the care plan?
 doctor
 nurse
 family

administration
 patient
 other

Who has authority to make decisions?
 does physician have authority to make
decision for pt.
 does pt have authority to refuse or demand
care
 does family have authority to refuse or
demand care
 authority lies with other agent or surrogate

A
SECTION

B
CHECK
ALL THAT
APPLY

SECTION

C
CHECK
ALL THAT
APPLY

CHECK
ALL THAT
APPLY

Areas of possible concern:
 professional codes
 interests/rights of other
 communication with
family/pt
 standard of care
 diagnosis & prognosis
 awareness of
community norms
 futility/utility
 protection of others
 reporting of errors
 efficacy/inefficacy
 legal obligations
 referral to social
services
Goals
of therapy:

privacy
 quality of life
 Should resuscitation be attempted?
 Shall artificial nutrition and hydration be utilized?
 Should a nursing home resident or someone ill at home be hospitalized?
 Is it time to reconsider treatment goals

SECTION

Discussed with:

SECTION

D
CHECK
ALL THAT
APPLY

SECTION

E

Patient signature:
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FORM FOR ASSESSMENT OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN PATIENT CARE
SECTION

G

“It’s hard to
get some of
our docs to
use new
forms,
especially if
they come
from
nursing.”
~ Nurse

SECTION

H

SECTION

I

Issues that
may need
further
attention:

Recommendations:

Please review this form if there is a substantial change in patient’s health status such as:
 Close to death
 Extraordinary suffering

 Improved condition
 Transfer

 Advanced progressive illness
 Permanent unconsciousness

Review of this form
Date of
review

Reviewer

Location of review

Outcome of review
 No change
 Form voided: new form
 Form voided: no new
form
 No change
 Form voided: new form
 Form voided: no new
form
 No change
 Form voided: new form
 Form voided: no new
form
 No change
 Form voided: new form
 Form voided: no new
form

If you have questions about the information we have discussed, you may contact:
Name:

_____________________________
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ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING MAP
1. ISSUE

2. PERSPECTIVES OF THOSE INVOLVED

3. LOCUS OF DECISION

What is the situation or dilemma?
(Outline briefly)

Patient’s/family’s concerns

Who has authority to act?










 does physician have authority to
force care on pt
 does pt have authority to refuse or
demand care
 does family have authority to refuse
or demand care
 authority lies with other agent






“If it won't
change the
outcome , but
would
happen to
another
patient, I
will talk to
the nurse.
Otherwise, I
may let it
go.”
~ Pharmacist

basic medical problem
medical indications for treatment
what decision needs to be made?
what are the patient/family
preferences?
 what are the preferences of
healthcare providers?
Who does what to whom and under
what circumstances?
 who is involved in the situation?
 what actions are planned?
 what information is being given &
withheld?
 who will experience consequences?
 how will the decision be achieved?

Is there a conflict of values?
 between healthcare provider and
patient/family
 among healthcare providers
 between healthcare provider(s) and
organization
 between the family and patient
 between patient and 3rd party payer

adequate disclosure
capacity to choose
ability to refuse therapy
coercion, duress or abandonment
advanced directives
surrogate decision makers
pt health vs family finances
religion, values & culture

The Healthcare Providers’ concerns












professional codes
standard of care
awareness of community norms
trust and professional reputation
diagnosis & prognosis
goals of therapy
efficacy/inefficacy
futility/utility
loyalty issues
communication with family/pt
institutional concerns & financial
constraints

How was the decision actually made in
terms of power?
(who had the final say?)
 doctor
 family
 patient
 nurse
 administration
 other

Contextual/systemic, & quality of life
issues

What ethical principles inform the
situation? (Examples)

 relevance of benefits, harms and
rights of others
 interests of others
 protection of others
 cost of care
 allocation of resources
 legal obligations
 effects on community and the
medical practice relations?
 life expectancy
 potential for disability & suffering

Autonomy:
 does the patient have the right to
refuse care?
 is patient informed enough to refuse
care?
 does the family have a right to know?
Competency:
 does the patient/family understand
the diagnosis and treatment?
Truth-telling
 how much information should the
healthcare providers provide?
Harm:
 will not telling cause harm?
 will telling cause harm?
 will forcing care cause harm?
 will not forcing care cause harm?
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“The
differences in
perspective
make finger
pointing
easier and
then
individual
responsibility
is lessened”
~ Physician

Tool 5: Readers Theater.
We developed Readers Theater scripts some years ago as a way to
share, with rural healthcare providers, the key findings from a series of
ethics and patient safety studies. When conducting these studies, we
learned that rural healthcare providers diligently strive to provide
quality care. However, healthcare professionals do not always look at
the world through the same lens. The reasons for this are many; they
do not attend the same conferences, read the same journals, or attend
the same staff meetings. Lamented one nurse: “We rarely have time to
talk to one another; sometimes I have to write a letter.” As a result,
rural healthcare providers do not really know or see on a daily basis
how divergent their world views can be. Moreover, some topics are
difficult to broach even under the best of circumstances.
Readers Theater offers healthcare providers a way to view their beliefs
and behaviors in a different light. The scripts draw on the quantitative
and qualitative data from our rural studies. Each tells a story about
several incidents that commonly occur in rural healthcare settings.
The incidents may involve a policy, such as advance directive, an error
such as an incorrect dose or procedure, or a cultural value such as
familiarity.
Each script has roles for a narrator and 5 or 6 readers who represent
the various healthcare professions, patients, and family members.
Volunteer readers are picked from the audience; no advance
preparation is required. We try to achieve role reversals, so that a
nurse, for example, will read the CEO’s lines, and a doctor the
patient’s and so on. At the close of the reading, a moderator fields a
series of questions that highlight gaps and areas of differing
perceptions among the different roles. The questions help identify the
issues, options, learning points, and areas for improvement. Initially,
the questions are directed to the readers who explain how it feels to
read someone else’s words and viewpoints; after that the audience is
encouraged to ask questions and offer insights. Participants testify that
the Readers Theater is a powerful way to learn other profession’s
viewpoints and to open up interdisciplinary dialogue.
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“When it
involves
changing
things- it gets
really hard
with some of
our people.
In rural
settings this
is so evident;
you have a
medical staff
that is very
close and
generally has
a lot of
power, and a
lot of the
staff has
been around
for along
time. It is
hard to get
them to make
changes.”
~ CEO

Narrator:

Patient safety has been identified as an issue of national concern.
Indeed, stories about healthcare errors are published in the
newspapers or the media every day. Congress is now considering a
number of bills that target patient safety. Some healthcare providers
dispute the IOM suggestion that as many as 98,000 people die every
year due to errors. But nearly everyone agrees that errors do happen
- and happen more frequently than they should. Hospitals are now
struggling to determine why errors occur and what can be done to
reduce them.

Quality C:

Our hospital really is concerned about patient safety. I think we have
a no shame/no blame approach. After all, mistakes happen to even
the best healthcare providers. We are all human. We document
medication errors and patient falls on our incident reports. And I
review the charts.

Admin:

I think our good catch policy has made a difference. We’ve provided
staff training; its a priority area. I think people feel more
comfortable talking about errors. We’re making steady progress. We
are making sure that our training activities involve nurses because it
seems that many of the errors involve nursing care.

Nurse:

Well the good catch deal lasted about a month.

Physician:

I will sleep better if some of your training has an impact. Last week I
ordered 10 units of insulin for a patient and he got 20. That kind of
error happens more often than we think - and it shouldn’t.

Nurse:

You’re talking about the no blame approach but listening to you, it
seems like the nurses are blamed. When we make a mistake, we
chart it. You can’t hide those things - they are pretty obvious. We
file incident reports and talk about what happened.

Physician:

Well that’s my point. Look at the incident reports. They’re filled
with medication errors. We have a lot of work to do. The nurses
give the wrong dose, or the wrong drug. Sometimes they give
medication at the wrong time, if not altogether omitted. Yesterday a
nurse gave the medication via IV instead of IM.

Quality C:

It’s true - we do have a lot of medication errors and some are serious.
Most don’t cause harm but those that do are really troublesome. But
we’re not alone. Look at the national efforts - they are all focusing
on medication errors.
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“I guess I am
not a
proponent for
having a
policy for
every single
thing, but as
far as these
situations go,
we need more
definitions
and clearer
guidelines.”
~ CEO

Admin:

We could look at ways to streamline the process, make it simpler if
that is the problem.

Nurse:

It’s not that simple. The spotlight will still shine on us because in
this hospital, doctors don’t make mistakes. They have sub-optimal
outcomes or practice variances. They use their clinical judgment and
have discretion. There’s no investigation. There are no errors. Well,
there are no errors on the official radar screen.

Physician:

That’s ridiculous. We have the M&M meeting every week. We have
peer review. If there’s a problem, we see it and the chief of staff
deals with it.

Pharmacist:

Well, some problems may be solved in M&M. But I’ll be honest.
You can’t blame just nursing. I’ve changed a lot of prescriptions
since I’ve been here. Actually, I have to make changes every week.
If I didn’t, someone would die.

Quality C:

You must be exaggerating. That’s illegal. I know that you and the
nurses have complained about bad handwriting. And we’ve been
trying out the new medication order form. A couple of the physicians
said they would give it a try.

Pharmacist:

Face it - most won’t use it. And when the orders are wrong, I’ll keep
changing them. I change conversion rates, I change doses. I change
the drugs. New guidelines come out. You can’t expect the
physicians to remember the specifics of all of these drugs. Sure
sometimes I call the physicians. But they get irritated when they get
so many calls. If a doc is just going to slam the phone in my ear or
throw a chart, what’s the point? I have to think of the patient. We’d
never get the prescriptions filled if I spent all of my time on the
telephone. I make the change, put a notation in the chart, and another
error is averted.

Nurse:

That’s my point. Do you call that an error? You don’t. Is that
change marked down on an incident report? It isn’t. Sometimes
when you make the changes you tell us to let the doctor know. And
then we are right in the middle. If I’m an hour late with a dose of
Tylenol, that’s an error. I wish we could just say clinical judgment
and the problem would magically disappear.
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Quality C:

You’re making me quite nervous. I think we have a good reporting
system. We’re on top of the new JCAHO guidelines. We encourage
you to alert us to any potential problems. And I think we’re being
fair.

Admin:

We’ve got a number of new systems in place. I think our concern for
patient safety is very genuine.

Nurse:

Well I don’t think those systems would have helped Mr. Brown. And
I sure got burned when I was taking care of him. He has really poor
circulation and we were treating his foot wound with dry dressings,
just as his cardiac surgeon had authorized. We were on top of the
problem and following current wound care guidelines. You know I
did attend the wound treatment seminar last month. When Mr.
Brown went back to his primary care physician there was no
coordination. You know who I am talking about; that doctor never
even called the cardiologist. He used the treatment he learned in
medical school 30 years ago. He debrided the wounds; it looks like
Mr Brown is going to lose his toes. When I complained to my
supervisor, I was accused of nitpicking and practicing medicine
without a license. She told me not to question the physician’s
clinical judgment.

Physician:

That’s not a fair example. The physician is under no obligation to
call the cardiologist. It may have been entirely appropriate to debride
the wounds. A physician does have to use his clinical judgment. You
can’t go snooping around in charts and guess what you would have
done in that circumstance.

Admin:

We’re getting a little off-center here. We can’t control what the
physicians do in their offices.

Nurse:

Right. But now he’s back in the hospital to have his toes amputated.
When can you question clinical judgement? When do you call it an
error? That primary care doc didn’t do any doppler studies. He
didn’t know if there was any circulation in those toes. I thought that
the failure to use the right tests or ignoring new clinical guidelines
was an error.

“I hear about
things 2-3
weeks after
they occurred.
I think,
hellloooo.”
~ Quality
Control
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“But I find
that people
don't perceive
an error to be
an error.
Physicians
just don’t
perceive these
things to be
errors. No
sir.”
~ Pharmacist

Physician:

Personally, I hate practicing by recipe. Intuition is an important
characteristic of the art of medicine. There is no substitute for our
clinical judgement - it is rooted in our experiences. We’d be wasting
our time if we tried to implement all the things suggested by the
patient safety foundation. We don’t have wrong site surgeries here.
We know our patients. We don’t need computers to tell us when to
schedule appointments.

Pharmacist:

You know, the nurse has a point. Clinical guidelines have a place.
We had that case last week when the 83 year-old patient came to the
ER with a hematoma. He was put on Coumadin when he was
hospitalized and the physician told him to return for a blood test in
three weeks. Just shy of 3 weeks, he came to the ER and his INR
was 14. The hematoma was serious; we’re lucky he didn’t have an
even more serious bleed. I think that’s an error and frankly it’s one
we see all too often.

Quality C:

That was an unfortunate case but I think you might be exaggerating.
I’m sure that doesn’t happen often. I do the chart reviews and I
haven’t seen very many cases like that one.

Nurse:

Of course not. Who is going to put something like that in the chart?
That gets buried. It happens a lot. Point A, he got Coumadin. Point
C, he was back at the hospital. No one is going to look at Point B.

Physician:

That’s my point about all of this error talk. That Coumadin case does
not involve an error. Period. It would be an error if the doctor had
ordered the blood tests and they were not done. I’m not casting
blame but the burden here is really on the hospital. The hospital
should have some policies if they want to avoid this kind of ahhhhh,
problem. It’s the discharge planner's fault. And patients have to be
empowered to take responsibility for their care.

Nurse:

That patient was 83 years old. Like I said, this stuff happens. It
never goes in the chart. It just gets buried. And I have no idea what
we are really supposed to tell the patient. And even if I had access to
the clinical guidelines, what am I supposed to do with them? Wave
them in the doctors face?

Admin:

Good grief. Tell the patient? There’s no need to start alarming
patients. There's no need to use words like errors.
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“I sit in with
medical staff
when they
are doing peer
review and
twice in the
last 6 months
when the care
has been
questionable,
the physician
approved it
because
everything
turned out
ok. So they
don’t
question the
standard of
care.”
~ Quality
Control

Pharmacist:

You know last year I suggested that we should start a warfarin clinic.
It’s a bad combination - old patients, warfarin and side effects. We
pharmacists understand the complications and we could be managing
these cases.

Physician:

Everybody thinks they should take over. Physicians are perfectly
competent and able to manage these cases. We do it all the time. I
am rigorous about ordering blood tests.

Quality C:

Of course you are. But what about some of the others? Do you ever
talk to them about their practices? Would you chart something like
this?

Physician:

Well, we have the M&M. But you don’t go looking in someone
else’s charts. We just don't. And you have to realize there is always
someone out there who wants to sue us. There are lawyers under
every bed. I’m a good doc but you’d cover this up. Problems
happen and you can’t avoid all of them.

Nurse:

I know you do the M&M thing. But it’s all behind locked doors. We
never hear about it. We don’t know if there is any follow-up. Should
I have told Mr. Brown to get a second opinion? His toes were at
stake. If it was my mother I’d want someone to tell her. But if my
supervisor says don’t ask/don’t tell - get real. I don’t. I’m certain
that 99.9% of close calls don’t get reported. And I don’t think that
most errors get reported either.

Pharmacist:

Well, gosh. These things get really sticky. Dr. Jones won’t use any
anesthetics when he circumcises those baby boys. Dr. Peters did a
wound debridement with no pain medication and the poor old woman
was just screaming. Are those errors? What do we do with things
like that? Are you suggesting that we tell the patients about things
like that? Good grief.

Physicians

Of course not. There is no need to explain to anyone when no lasting
harm has been caused.

Nurse:

And patients aren’t told. Not really. We might tell them that we gave
them the wrong medicine. But we wouldn’t tell them why or what
really happened.
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“We have a
good medical
staff but
they pooh
pooh some of
this error
stuff and
argue about
definitions.”
~ Quality
Control

Quality C:

It doesn’t sound like were on the same page at all. But I am not sure
what we should do at this point. We don’t have time to do the root
cause analysis for every little thing. My confidence in our ability to
make things safer is shrinking a little.

Admin:

I don’t like this conversation. There seems little that I can do about
it. You’d think the leader could effect change, but the rubber meets
the road on the lowest level.

Nurse:

Well, there are many things that go wrong and for every one you
notice, there are 10 you don’t. When it comes to errors, it's not just
being worried about legal issues; it’s a face saving issue.

Quality C:

No-one is sure what to do. It’s going to take a long time. We still
run on the premise that we know best and people should be happy
with what they get.

Questions for Discussion
How did it feel to participate as a Reader or as a member of the audience?
?
Did the behaviors of the various players help solve problems or intensify
problems?
?
What were the consequences for the hospital, the community, healthcare
providers, patients, and community members?
?
What activities escalated interpersonal tensions?
What kinds of problems developed in this story?
?
Communication - problems related to flow and availability of information
?
Training - issues related to on the job training and continuing education
?
Fatigue and Scheduling - issues related to changes, fatigue, staffing patterns
?
Environmental /Equipment - general suitability of the environment
?
Rules, policies and procedures - existence and accessibility of directives
?
Effectiveness of Barriers that protect people and property from adverse
events
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“I look for
opportunities
to heal the
pain caused
by the
impossible
promise of
practicing
medicine
perfectly.”
~ Physician

How did the different players respond to the various problems?
?
Did the perceptions of healthcare providers stem from variations among the
disciplines or deep philosophical differences?
?
Was there evidence of differences in clinical judgment styles among
healthcare professionals?
?
Did the characters have different perspectives on prognosis and goals of
medicine?
?
Did the characters have different information about the patient and family?
?
Were there different perceptions of legal repercussions?
?
Characterize the different views on patient autonomy, impartiality, and
fairness.
?
Were the patient’s and family’s perception of care different from that of
healthcare providers?
?
Discuss the different perceptions regarding who serves as the patient’s
advocate.
?
What do we do with people who don’t think like we do?
What were the organizational processes?
?
Where did patients receive “bad news” and how were patients/families
asked to make decisions?
?
What kinds of relationships existed among staff?
?
Who was involved in patient care decision-making?
?
Were lines of responsibility clear?
?
What were the consequences for the different stakeholders?
?
What would a "level playing field" look like?
?
How could organizational structures be changed to create a more level
playing field
What kinds of behaviors might have been more helpful?
?
Was there mutual awareness of problems?
?
What practical resources might help address/discuss problems?
?
Was there a shared commitment to experiential and behavioral changes PACE (positive, accepting, curious, and empathy)
?
What might this community and hospital do to heighten levels of
patient safety?
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“We came to
this
profession
with a
promise to
care. That's
really what
we're all
about."

From good intentions
to good actions....

~ Physician

The journey continues.
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